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California Supreme Court Survey
September 1995 - December 1996
The California Supreme Court Survey prvides a brief synopsis of recent
decisions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to itform the read-
er of issues that the supreme court has addressed, as well as to serve as a start-
ing point for researching any of the topical areas. Attorney discipline, judicial
misconduct, and death penalty appeal cases have been omitted from the survey.
The survey will review California Supreme Court cases in either an article or
summary format Articles provide an in-depth analysis of selected California
Supreme Court cases including the potential impact a case may have on Califor-
nia law. Additionally, articles guide the reader to secondary sources that focus
on specific points of law.
Summaries provide a brief outline of the areas of law addressed in selected
California Supreme Court cases. Summaries are designed to provide the reader
with a basic understanding of the legal implications of cases in a concise for-
mat
ARTICLES
I. COVENANTS, CONDITIONS, AND RESTRICTIONS
Publicly recording covenants, conditions, and restric-
tions provides adequate constructive notice to bind fu-
ture purchasers to these recorded restrictions, despite the
lack of specific reference to the covenants, conditions,
and restrictions in the deed:
Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson..... 1083
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A reasonable legislative action regulating an inherent
judicial power does not violate the separation of powers
doctrine if the function of the judicial branch is not de-
feated or materially impaired:
Superior Court v. County of Mendocino ........... 1090
1077
E[. COUNTIES
A sales tax proposed by the transportation authority is a
"special tax" applied by a "special district" within the
meaning of the statutory initiative; thus, the tax was
subject to a statutory requirement that local special taxes
be approved by a two-thirds vote among the local elector-
ate. The proposed sales tax received less than the two-
thirds vote required by statute and was held invalid
because it failed to satisfy the threshold statutory re-
quirement:
Santa Clara County Local Transportation
Authority v. Guardino .......................... 1096
IV. CRIMINAL LAW
The 1986 amendment to Penal Code section 664(a) cre-
ates a penalty provision rather than a delineation of
degrees of attempted murder; therefore, a defendant can
be retried on the issue of premeditation and deliberation:
People v. Bright ... .......................... 1106
V. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
A parent seeking relocation does not bear a burden of
establishing that the move is ' necessary" as a condition
of custody:
In re Marriage of Burgess ..................... 1113
VI. EMPLOYMENT LAw
A plaintiff may state a cause of action for fraudulent in-
ducement of an employment contract because: (1) fraud
actions are permitted in the employment context, and
(2) damages for employment termination are not limited
to contract remedies:
Lazar v. Superior Court ....................... 1119
VII. EVIDENCE
When a defendant's testimony implicates a codefendant
in a joint trial, redaction of that testimony is examined
on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the
codefendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is
violated:
People v. Fletcher ............................. 1127
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VIII. INImATiE AND REFERENDUM
A legislative amendment which excludes surety insur-
ance from a voter implemented rate rollback and approv-
al statute is invalid because it does not further the pur-
poses of Proposition 103, the statute under which the
amendment was codified:
Amwest Surety Insurance Co. v. Wilson ............ 1134
IX PRoPERTY / EMINENT DOMAN
A fee imposed by the city on an individualized and dis-
cretionary basis as a condition to issuing a development
permit can be a compensable regulatory taking under the
Fifth Amendment and is subject to a heightened stan-
dard of judicial scrutiny. Furthermore, a general ordi-
nance requiring either the placement of art on a develop-
ment site or payment of its equivalent value is within
the authority of the city, and is not a taking under the
Fifth Amendment:
Ehrlich v. City of Culver City .................... 1139
X. ZONING AND PLANNING
A mining or extractive activity operated as a legal non-
conforming use may move into areas not in use at the
time of an ordinance's passage if the operator can dem-
onstrate a manifest objective intent to move into the area
prior to the ordinance's enactment:
Hansen Brothers Enterprises v. Board
of Supervisors ................................ 1148
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SUMMARIES
I. Construction of Wills
A court must apply the law in existence at the time a
will is executed to determine the presumed intent of
a testator, unless a contrary intent is expressed in
the will.
Newman v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Supreme Court of
California, Decided December 5, 1996, 14 Cal. 4th 126,
926 P.2d 969, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2.................. 1156
H. Courts (Jurisdiction)
Where defendant owners of out-of-state restaurant
franchises purposefully avail themselves of the bene-
fits of a forum state by reaching out to forum resi-
dents to create an ongoing franchise relationship,
the franchisees have sufficient contacts with the fo-
rum state such that the forum state may exercise
specific jurisdiction over the non-resident defen-
dants.
Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., Supreme
Court of California, Decided December 12, 1996, 14 Cal.
4th 434, 926 P.2d 1085, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 ......... 1157
IlL. Criminal Law
A. Because the initiative version of the "three strikes"
provision, Proposition 184, was substantively identi-
cal to the legislative version of the statute, Penal
Code section 667, the legislature's definition of a
prior felony conviction, which included out-of-state
convictions, was applied to Proposition 184.
People v. Hazelton, Supreme Court of California, Decided
December 5, 1996, 14 Cal. 4th 101, 926 P.2d 423, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 443 ................................ 1159
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B. Evidence of third party threats is admissible to sup-
port a self-defense claim if there is evidence that the
defendant reasonably associated the victim with
those threats.
People v. Minfie, Supreme Court of California, Decided
August 29, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 1055, 920 P.2d 1337, 56
Cal. Rptr. 2d 133 ............................. 1160
C. A defendant cannot claim his right to effective coun-
cil was violated when he was represented by an at-
torney who was on inactive states when the suspen-
sion resulted from noncompliance with mandatory
continuing legal education (MCLE) requirements.
People v. Ngo, Decided October 24, 1996, 14 Cal. 4th 30,
57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 456. .......................... 1161
IV. Deed of Trust
Civil Code section 2943 permits a seller to seek re-
covery of sums omitted from a payoff statement as
an unsecured obligation under the principles of un-
just enrichment.
Ghirardo v. Antonioli, Supreme Court of California,
Decided October 31, 1996, 14 Cal. 4th 39, 924 P.2d 996,
57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687. .......................... 1162
V. Healing Arts
Investigative subpoenas issued by the Medical Board
of California while conducting an inquiry into physi-
cian misconduct are not "discovery" within the
meaning of California Evidence Code section 1157,
which provides that hospital peer review committee
records are not subject to discovery.
Arnett v. Dal Cielo, Supreme Court of California, Decided
October 3, 1996, 14 Cal. 4th 4, 923 P.2d 1, 56 Cal. Rptr.
2d 706 ....................................... 1163
VI. Health & Safety
The Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act
of 1986 is applicable to water stored in or run
through household drinking water faucets as a
"source of drinking water."
People ex rel. Lungren, Supreme Court of Caifornia,
Decided December 9, 1996, 14 Cal. 4th 294, 926 P.2d
1042, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 ...................... 1165
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I. COVENANTS, CONDITIONS, AND RESTRICTIONS
Publicly recording covenants, conditions, and restric-
tions provides adequate constructive notice to bind fu-
ture purchasers to these recorded restrictions, despite the
lack of specific reference to the covenants, conditions,
and restrictions in the deed: Citizens for Covenant
Compliance v. Anderson.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson,1 the California
Supreme Court considered whether the recording of covenants, condi-
tions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) is enough to bind a future purchaser,
even though the restrictions are not mentioned in the deed.2 The superi-
1. 12 CaL 4th 345, 906 P.2d 1314, 47 CaL Rptr. 2d 898 (1995). The majority opinion
was written by Justice Arabian, with whom Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Mosk,
Baxter, George, and Werdegar concurred. Id, at 348-69, 906 P.2d at 1315-29, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 900-13. Justice Kennard filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 369-88, 906 P.2d at
1329-41, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 913-26 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 356, 906 P.2d at 1320, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 905. The Andersons wanted to
maintain a winery on their parcels of land through an agreement with a company in
the United Kingdom named Chaine d'Or Vineyards. Id. at 351, 906 P.2d at 1317, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 902. In addition, the Andersons owned seven llamas which they intended to
keep as pets. Id, However, the CC&Rs of both parcels of land prohibited such use of
the property. Id, at 349-51, 906 P.2d at 1316-17, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 901-02. The first
parcel of land under consideration was subdivided in the 1950s and was known as
Skywood Acres. Id, at 349, 906 P.2d at 1316, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 901. CC&Rs on this
parcel restricted the property to residential use and limited the type of pets allowed to
"Id]ogs, cats, hares, fowls, . . . fish," and in some instances, horses. Id at 350, 906
P.2d at 1316-17, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 901. The restrictions were recorded in San Mateo
County and contained a provision that they were to be binding upon future successors
in interest Id, at 349-50, 906 P.2d at 1316-17, 47 CaL Rptr. 2d at 901. These restric-
tions were not mentioned in the Andersons' deed or in their chain of title. Id at 350,
906 P.2d at 1317, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 901. The second parcel of land the Andersons
owned was known as the Friars subdivision. Id The developer of the Friars subdivi-
sion recorded CC&Rs that restricted the property to single-family residential use and
prohibited the "keeping [of] animals other than household pets and horses." Id. at 350-
51, 906 P.2d at 1317, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 901. The Friars parcel similarly contained an
intention to bind future owners. Id. at 350-51, 906 P.2d at 1317, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
901-02. To enforce these restrictions, the Citizens for Covenant Compliance, as well as
representative landowners from .both Skywood Acres and the Friars subdivision, filed
suit to prevent the Andersons from continuing their winery and keeping the liamas as
pets. Id. at 351, 906 P.2d at 1318, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 902.
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or court found that the CC&Rs were not enforceable and granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendants.3 The court of appeal affirmed
the decision of the lower court, finding that the CC&Rs were not en-
forceable as either covenants or equitable servitudes.' The California
Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and formulat-
ed a new rule for determining the enforceability of CC&Rs' According
to Justice Arabian, this rule serves to simplify the enforcement of CC&Rs
by necessitating the recording of only one document and omitting the
need to review all the deeds and restrictions upon an entire subdivision.'
I. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Arabian began the majority opinion by explicitly stating the
rule that the court adopted:
[I]f a declaration establishing a common plan for the ownership of property in a
subdivision and containing restrictions upon the use of property as part of the
common plan is recorded before the execution of the contract of sale... the
restrictions... are not unenforceable merely because they are not additionally
cited in a deed or other document at the time of the sale
After setting forth the relevant facts of the case, Justice Arabian dis-
cussed the law governing real covenants8 and equitable servitudes.' De-
3. Id. at 351, 368, 906 P.2d at 1318, 1329, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 902, 913.
4. Id. at 351-52, 906 P.2d at 1318, 47 CaL Rptr. 2d at 902; see iznfu notes 8-9 (dis-
cussing the history of real covenants and equitable servitudes).
5. Id. at 349, 906 P.2d at 1316, 47 Cal Rptr. 2d at 900-01. See infra note 7 and ac-
companying text.
6. Id. at 363, 906 P.2d at 1325, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 910.
7. Id. at 349, 906 P.2d at 1316, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900-01.
8. Real covenants developed as an action at law and "run with the land" according
to statutory provision. See id. at 353, 906 P.2d at 1318-19, 47 Cal Rptr. 2d at 903; see
also CAL CIV. CODE §§ 1460-1468 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996); 26 CAL Jun- 3D Deeds
§§ 237-249 (1976 & Supp. 1996) (discussing covenants running with the land); 4 B.E.
WrrITN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Real Pyoperty §§ 486-489 (9th ed 1987 & Supp.
1996) (discussing the nature and elements of covenants running with the land). Previ-
ous statutory law provided that in order to bind future purchasers, a real covenant
must "benefit" rather than "burden" the affected parcel. Anderson, 12 Cal 4th at 353,
906 P.2d at 1319, 47 Cal Rptr. 2d at 903. In addition, the covenant would not "run
with the land" unless it was "'made by the owner of land with the owner of other
land,' and not to a covenant between a grantor and a grantee." Id. (quoting Maria v.
Aetna Const. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 377, 101 P.2d 490, 492 (1940)). Therefore, under the
old rule, the CC&Rs in the present case would not run with the land because there
was a burden on the property and the relationship was between a grantor and a grant-
ee.
9. Equitable servitudes arose out of the development of equity courts to cover
situations in which restrictions did not run with the land as covenants. See Anderson,
1084
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spite the differences between the two doctrines, the court stated that the
rule announced will govern both areas."0 Justice Arabian also reviewed
the recording process, reiterating the rule that recordation of any docu-
ment affecting the title to real property provides constructive notice of
that document to future purchasers."
Next, the court addressed prior cases that have shaped the current
state of the law. 2 First, Werner v. Graham3 involved restrictions that
were placed in earlier deeds but not included in the plaintiffs deed.4
Furthermore, the restrictions were not recorded.5 The Werner court
held that the restrictions were unenforceable because they were not
stated in the deed.'"
Second, the court discussed Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Commit-
tee.'7 In Riley, as in Werner, no restrictions were mentioned in the
deed.'8 Instead, the developer recorded the restrictions nine months af-
12 Cal. 4th at 353, 906 P.2d at 1319, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 903; see also 4 B.E. WrmN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real PrOperty § 493 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1996) (dis-
cussing the nature and effect of equitable servitudes). California courts have tradition-
ally used this doctrine to review CC&Rs. Anderson, 12 Cal. 4th at 354, 906 P.2d at
1319, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 903. For a discussion regarding the use and enforcement of
equitable servitudes in planned unit developments, also known as common interest
developments, see generally Armand Arabian, Condos, Cats, and CC&Rs: Invasion of
the Castle Common, 23 PEPP. L REv. 1 (1995); Carl B. Kress, Beyond Nahrstedt- Re-
viewing Restrictions Governing Life in a Property Owner Association, 42 UCLA L
REV. 837 (1995); Daniel R. Puterbaugh, Comment, The Reasonable Pe. An Examination
of the Enforcement of Restrictions in California Common Interest Developments After
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside village Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 793
(1996). Due to statutory amendment, real covenants are now more similar to equitable
servitudes in that they are no longer applicable to CC&Rs made between a grantor and
a grantee. Anderson, 12 Cal. 4th at 354, 906 P.2d at 1319, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 903; see
also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1468 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996). However, these amendments do
not cover covenants made before their enactment. Anderson, 12 CaL 4th at 354, 906
P.2d at 1319, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 904.
10. Anderson, 12 Cal. 4th at 355, 906 P.2d at 1320, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 904.
11. Id.; see also 55 CAL JuR. 3D Records and Recording Laws §§ 37-39 (1980 &
Supp. 1996) (discussing constructive notice as imputed by recording laws); 4 B.E.
WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property § 198 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1996)
(discussing the nature of the California recording process).
12. Anderson, 12 Cal. 4th at 356-60, 906 P.2d at 320-23, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 905-08.
13. 181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945 (1919).
14. Anderson, 12 Cal. 4th at 356, 906 P.2d at 1320-21, 47 CaL Rptr. 2d at 905.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 359, 906 P.2d at 1321-22, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 905.06.
17. 17 Cal. 3d 500, 551 P.2d 1213, 131 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1976).
18. Anderson, 12 Cal. 4th at 356, 906 P.2d at 1321, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 905.
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ter the conveyance of the property, intending them to apply to the previ-
ously sold lots.1" The Riley court, however, stated that the developer
could not restrict the property once sold because he no longer retained a
valid interest.2 In addition, dicta in Riley suggested that Murry v.
Lovell required the restrictions to be recited in the deed.'
The court found both cases factually distinguishable from the instant
case because proper recording did not take place in either Werner or
Riley.' Furthermore, because no common plan had been recorded in
Werner or Riley, the only way to adequately determine the agreement of
the parties was to look to the deeds.2'
The court next reviewed the current uncertainties in the law relating
to CC&Rs.' First, in many instances, the order of conveyances governs
the enforceability of restrictions.' Second, these uncertainties serve to
"dramatically complicate[]" title searchesY The court concluded by stat-
ing that the law is not entirely clear on this subject, thus creating a "cra-
zy-quilt pattern of uses.' 2s
Justice Arabian next discussed the solution to these uncertainties and
the advantages of adopting the new rule relating to notice of CC&Rs.'
In addition, the court asserted that the new rule is consistent with prior
case law.' Previous courts have merely assumed that deeds must con-
19. Id.
20. Id. at 358, 906 P.2d at 1322, 47 CaL Rptr. 2d at 906.
21. 132 CaL. App. 2d 30, 281 P.2d 316 (1955).
22. Anderson, 12 Cal. 4th at 359, 906 P.2d at 1322, 47 CaL Rptr. 2d at 907.
23. Id. at 356-57, 906 P.2d at 1321, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 905.
24. Id. at 359, 906 P.2d at 1323, 47 CaL Rptr. 2d at 907.
25. Id. at 360-63, 906 P.2d at 1323-25, 47 Cal Rptr. 2d at 908-09.
26. Id. at 360, 906 P.2d at 1323, 47 CaL Rptr. 2d at 908. The court provided an ex-
ample of the discrepancies resulting from the confusion created by the current state of
the law. Id. at 361-62, 906 P.2d at 1324, 47 CaL Rptr. 2d at 908-09. If the CC&Rs are
not inserted in the first deed, but are later included in the fifth deed, the restrictions
"spring[] into existence from deed five onwards." Id. at 351, 906 P.2d at 1324, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 908. Furthermore, if deeds five and six contain the restrictions, but seven
and eight do not, "lot owners five and six can enforce the restrictions against seven
and eight, but seven and eight cannot enforce them against each other." Id. Finally, if
the CC&Rs are once again placed in deeds nine and ten, "lot owners seven and eight
cannot enforce the restrictions against nine and ten, and similarly nine and ten cannot
enforce them against seven and eight" Id. at 361-62, 906 P.2d at 1324, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 909.
27. Id. at 362, 906 P.2d at 1325, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 909. Potential buyers must
search all deeds in the subdivision as well as all deeds within their own chain of title.
Id. This complicated title search takes place whether the CC&Rs are mentioned in the
deed or not because the owner of such property containing the restrictions would be
entitled to enforce those restrictions against the later purchasers. Id.
28. Id. at 362-63, 906 P.2d at 1325, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 909.
29. Id. at 363-68, 906 P.2d at 1325-28, 47 CaL Rptr. 2d at 909-13.
30. Id. at 365, 906 P.2d at 1326-27, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.
1086
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tain the restrictions to which a buyer is bound in order to "evidence the
purchaser's intent and agreement"3 However, the court found it rea-
sonable to conclude that "property conveyed after the restrictions are
recorded is subject to those restrictions even without further mention in
the deed" because of the established notion of constructive notice.'
Finally, the court addressed the Andersons' argument that the new rule
should not apply retrospectively because they were relying on previous
law.' The court disregarded this argument, citing the established princi-
ple that "a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is
retrospective in its operation."
Thus, the California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal based
solely on the narrow issue of whether a deed must independently contain
the CC&Rs.
B. Justice Kennard's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennard began her dissent with a brief discussion of the back-
ground of the case' and the historical development of real covenants
and equitable servitudes.' The dissent stated that the restrictions con-
tained in the Friars and the Skywood Acres subdivisions would not be
enforceable under previous law.' According to Justice Kennard, the ma-
jority conceded this point but chose to adopt a new rule in order to
uphold the CC&Rs.-
Justice Kennard disagreed with the majority on two points. First, she
found that eliminating the need to place restrictions in a deed of pur-
chase effectively dispensed with the need for mutual agreement between
31. Id. at 365, 906 P.2d at 1327, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.
32. Id. at 365-66, 906 P.2d at 1327, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.
33. Id. at 367, 906 P.2d at 1327-28, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 912.
34. Id, at 367, 906 P.2d at 1328, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 912 (quoting Peterson v. Superi-
or CL, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 151, 642 P.2d 1305, 1306, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784, 785 (1982)).
35. I& at 368-69, 906 P.2d at 1329, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 913.
36. Id. at 370-72, 906 P.2d at 1330-31, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 914-16 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting).
37. Id. at 372-75, 906 P.2d at 1331-33, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916-17 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting); see supra notes 8-9. Justice Kennard did not dispute the statement of law
made by Justice Arabian; she merely set forth the law in her own words. Id. at 372-
75, 906 P.2d at 1331-33, 47 Cal Rptr. 2d at 916-17 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 375-76, 906 P.2d at 1333, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 917-18 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing).
39. Id. at 376, 906 P.2d at 1333, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 918 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 376, 906 P.2d at 1333-34, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 918 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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the buyer and the seller.' Second, she claimed that the rule adopted by
the majority violated section 1468 of the California Civil Code.' Justice
Kennard argued that the court lacked the power to create a rule in con-
flict with existing statutory law." Instead, the legislature should be the
forum for such change."
Finally, Justice Kennard stated that the court should not apply the
newly adopted rule retroactively." The dissent recognized as an excep-
tion to the general rule of retroactivity that "where... property rights
[are] acquired in accordance with the prior decision.., vested rights
[will not] be impaired by applying the new rule retroactively.'"
41. Id. at 377, 906 P.2d at 1334, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 918 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Kennard, this rule is based on two premises. Id. at 377, 906 P.2d
at 1334, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 919 (Kennard, J., dissenting). First, the majority must find
that recording CC&Rs is sufficient to constitute constructive notice, ld. (Kennard, J.,
dissenting). Justice Kennard stated that the law governing constructive notice does not
cover CC&Rs because CC&Rs do not comport with the definition of "conveyance" as
required by California Civil Code § 1213. Id, at 377-78, 906 P.2d at 1334-35, 47 CaL
Rptr. 2d at 919 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Second, despite the lack of specific inclusion
of the CC&Rs in the deed, the majority presumes the buyer has agreed to be bound
by the CC&Rs. ld. at 377, 906 P.2d at 1334, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 919 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting). Justice Kennard asserted that under section 1106 of the California Civil Code,
restrictions purporting to bind the successor "must be expressly stated in the deed."
Id. at 380, 906 P.2d at 1336, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921 (Kennard, J., dissenting). There-
fore, "if the subdivider gives every purchaser an unrestricted grant deed ... then each
purchaser receives the subdivider's entire interest in the lot purchased and the restric-
tions never come into existence." Id. at 379, 906 P.2d at 1336, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 920
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
42. ld. at 381-82, 906 P.2d at 1337-38, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921-22 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting). Under § 1468, a subdivider must record an instnument containing the CC&Rs.
Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). In Justice Kennard's view, property law defines an instru-
ment as "a document that either trasfers or creates an interest in real property." Id,
at 382, 906 P.2d at 1337, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 922 (Kennard, J., dissenting). A document
merely containing restrictions that encumber the property does not transfer or create a
property interest Id (Kennard, J., dissenting).
43. Id at 382, 906 P.2d at 1337-38, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 922 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 383, 906 P.2d at 1338, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 922-23 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
The dissent provided as example an instance where the legislature created special rules
applying to planned unit developments. ld. (Kennard, J., dissenting); see Nahrstedt v.
Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n, 8 Cal. 4th 361, 878 P.2d 1275, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 63
(1994). See generally Arabian, supra note 9; Kress, supra note 9; Paula C. Murray, Re-
strictive Covenants in Homeowners' Associations: Are They Going to the Dogs? 23
REAL EST. LJ. 356 (1994-95); Sheri L Marvin, Note, California Supreme Court Survey:
A Review of Decisions, Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 22
PEPP. L REv. 1692 (1995); Puterbaugh, supra note 9.
45. Anderson, 12 Cal. 4th at 383-87, 906 P.2d at 133841, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 923-25
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
46. Id at 383, 906 P.2d at 1339, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 922 (Kennard, J., dissenting)
(quoting Moraldi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 304, 758 P.2d 58,
69, 260 Cal. Rptr. 116, 126 (1988).
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I. IMPACT
According to the majority, the new rule has three beneficial impacts.
First, the rule promotes simplicity.47 Title searchers will only have to
look at one document, the recorded CC&Rs, to determine the extent of
the restrictions.' Second, the adoption of the new rule is considered
"good policy" due to the increased use of CC&Rs in the modem mar-
ket.' Third, the rule "fulfill[s] the intent, expectations, and wishes of
the parties and community as a whole."' In addition, the rule is fair be-
cause developers no longer have the burden of placing restrictions on all
future conveyances of property."'
However, according to Justice Kennard's dissent, applying the new rule
retroactively will impose a significant financial burden upon landowners
who rely upon prior law in land use planning.' In addition, this decision
does not automatically favor Citizens for Covenant Compliance, as there
are other issues that remain to be litigated.'
IV. CONCLUSION
The rule adopted by the court in Anderson simplifies property law in
the area of restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes by eliminating
the requirement that developers include CC&Rs in all subsequent
deeds." Recording one document identifying all restrictions upon the
property is sufficient to provide successors in interest constructive no-
tice, thereby binding future purchasers to all recorded restrictions.'
MARISA CASrAGNET
47. Id. at 363, 906 P.2d at 1325, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 910.
48. Id. Previously, title searches were much more complicated, entailing a tedious
search of all deeds in the buyer's chain of title, as well as all other deeds conveyed to
other members of the subdivision. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
49. Anderson, 12 Cal. 4th at 363-64, 906 P.2d at 1325-26, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 910.
50. Id. at 364, 906 P.2d at 1326, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 910.
51. Id. at 364-65, 906 P.2d at 1326, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 910-11.
52. Id. at 384, 906 P.2d at 1339, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 923 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 368, 906 P.2d at 1329, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 913.
54. Id. at 349, 906 P.2d at 1316, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900-01.
55. Id.; see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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II. CONSTTUTIONAL LAW
A reasonable legislative action regulating an inherent
judicial power does not violate the separation of powers
doctrine if the function of the judicial branch is not de-
feated or materially impaired:
Superior Court v. County of Mendocino.
I. INRODUCTION
In Superior Court v. County of Mendocino,' the California Supreme
Court addressed whether the legislative enactment of Government Code
section 68108, requiring superior, municipal, and justice courts to close
on days designated by the individual counties, violated the separation of
powers doctrine by regulating an inherent power of the judicial branch.2
The trial court held that the statute did not violate the separation of
powers doctrine.3 The court of appeal reversed, reasoning that because
the judiciary possesses the inherent power "to control their own hours
and days of operation," the legislature violated the separation of powers
1. 13 Cal. 4th 45, 913 P.2d 1046, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (1996). Justice George wrote
the m9jority opinion in which Justices Mosk, Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, and Chin con-
curred. Id. at 48-66, 913 P.2d at 1048-60, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839-51. Chief Justice Lucas
wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 66-67, 913 P.2d at 1060-61, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 851
(Lucas, C.J., concurring).
2. Id. at 48-52, 913 P.2d at 1048-50, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839-41. The California Leg-
islature enacted section 68108 in 1993 as a result of the urgent fiscal situation. Id. at
49, 913 P.2d at 1048, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839. Section 68108 authorizes counties to
specify unpaid furlough days in which superior, municipal, and justice courts are to
remain closed. Id. Mendocino County issued a memorandum of understanding desig-
nating six unpaid furlough days for the 1993-1994 budget year under section 68108. Id.
at 49-50, 913 P.2d at 1049, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839-40. However, after voicing its op-
position to the county's action, the Superior Court of Mendocino County remained
open during the first two specified days. Id. at 50, 913 P.2d at 1049, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 840. Shortly thereafter, the superior court directed the county to pay its employees'
salaries for the two designated furlough days. Id. As a result of non-payment, the supe-
rior court brought suit against the County of Mendocino, the Board of Supervisors, the
county administrative officer, and the county auditor/controller seeking declaratory re-
lief, injunctive relief and a writ of mandate requiring payment for the two furlough
days and future inclusion in the furlough program only upon its approval. Id. at 51,
913 P.2d at 1049-50, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840. The county filed a cross-complaint seeking
declaratory relief approving the county's actions under section 68108. Id.; see CAL
GOV'T CODE § 68108 (West 1976 & Supp. 1996). See generally 7 B.E. WnIUN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 107 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (discussing
the separation of powers doctrine).
3. County of Mendocino, 13 Cal. 4th at 51, 913 P.2d at 1050, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
840-41. By agreement of the parties, the sole issue determined at trial was whether
section 68108 was constitutional on its face. Id
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doctrine by exercising a power exclusively retained by the judicial
branch.' Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the California
Supreme Court held the code constitutional, reasoning that the
legislature's regulation of such inherent power did not defeat or material-
ly impair the court's fulfillment of its constitutional purpose.'
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Justice George began his analysis of the separation of powers doctrine
by examining the interaction between a legislative act and an inherent
judicial power.' Justice George noted that while the separation of pow-
ers doctrine limits the actions of the branches,' California courts have
continually recognized the interrelatedness of the three branches.8 After
4. Id. at 51, 913 P.2d at 1050, 51 Cal Rptr. 2d at 841.
5. Id. at 52-66, 913 P.2d at 1050-60, 51 Cal Rptr. 2d at 841-61.
6. Id. at 52-59, 913 P.2d at 1050-55, 51 Cal. Rpr. 2d at 841-45; see CA CONST. ar.
HI, § 3 ("The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial Per-
sons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others
except as permitted by this Constitution."). See generally 7 B.E. WrrN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 111 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the
powers of the legislative branch); 16 CAL. Jun. 3D Courts § 17 (1989) (detailing the in-
herent powers of the judicial branch); George Anbang, Separation of Powers and the
Rule of Law: On the Role of Judicial Restraint In "Securling] the Blessings of Liber-
ty", 24 AKRON L REv. 211 (1990) (discussing the rationale behind the separation of
powers doctrine).
7. County of Mendocino, 13 Cal. 4th at 52-53, 913 P.2d at 1050-51, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 841-42. See generally 13 CAL Ju. 3D Constitutional Law § 101 (1989 & Supp. 1996)
(discussing the limits of the separation of powers doctrine); Phillip B. Kurland, The
Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 MIc. L REV. 592 (1986)
(describing the evolution of the interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine);
James M. McGoldrick, Jr., The Separation of Powers Doctrine: Straining Out Gnats,
Swallowing Camels, 18 PEPP. L REV. 95 (1990) (detailing recent Supreme Court inter-
pretations of the separation of powers doctrine).
8. County of Mendocino, 13 Cal. 4th at 52-53, 913 P.2d at 1051, 51 Cal Rptr. 2d at
841-42; see also Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 442, 281 P. 1018, 1020 (1929)
(stating that while the government operates under the separation of powers doctrine,
"this does not mean that the three departments of our government are not in many re-
spects mutually dependent"). See generally 13 CAL. JuR. 3D Constitutional Law § 102
(1989) (discussing various interactions between the three branches of government);
Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers: Interpretation Outside the Courts, 18 PEPP. L REV.
67 (1990) (discussing the evolution of the separation of powers outside of court inter-
pretation); Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLux L REv.
371 (1976) (tracing the development and purposes of the separation of powers doc-
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a thorough review of each case relied on by the court of appeal,9 Justice
George concluded that while the judiciary possesses an inherent power
to ensure continued operation of that branch, the legislature is not fore-
closed from enacting reasonable regulations which do not defeat or ma-
terially impair the court's function.'0
The supreme court next considered the trial court's contention that the
California Constitution reserves the power of determining days of opera-
tion solely to the judicial branch." Refuting the plaintiffs claim, Justice
George first stated that past and current statutes regulating legal holidays
reflect the legislature's perceived authority in this area. 2 Second, the
court found that statutes regulating holidays have been upheld by past
California courts. 3 Third, Justice George noted that a fiscal crisis has
trine).
9. County of Mendocino, 13 Cal. 4th at 53-59, 913 P.2d at 1051-55, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 841-45 (citing BrydoWack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 281 P. 1018 (1929) (holding that
although bar admission is an inherent power of the judiciary, the legislature is not
foreclosed from imposing reasonable regulations that do not defeat or materially impair
the function of the judicial branch); Millholen v. Riley, 211 Cal. 29, 34, 293 P. 69, 71
(1930) (stating that while the judiciary may act to ensure its livelihood, the legislature
may still impose restrictions "so long as their efficiency is not thereby impaired");
Johnson v. Superior Court; 50 Cal. 2d 693, 329 P.2d 5 (1958) (holding a statute enacted
by the legislature that set guidelines for disqualification of judges was a reasonable
regulation and did not interfere with an inherent power of the court); In re McKinney,
70 Cal. 2d 8, 447 P.2d 972, 73 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1968) (upholding a statute dictating con-
tempt of crime penalties as a reasonable legislative act)). See generally Annotation,
Power of Legislature Respecting Admission to Bar, 66 A.LIR 1512 (1930) (discussing
the inherent power of the court to determine bar admission requirements and the leg-
islature's authority to impose reasonable regulations thereon).
10. County of Mendocino, 13 Cal. 4th at 58-59, 913 P.2d at 1054-55, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 845. "It does not follow ... that the Legislature necessarily violates the separation
of powers doctrine whenever it legislates with regard to such an inherent judicial pow-
er or function." Id. at 57, 913 P.2d at 1054, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845. See generally 16
CJ.S. Constitutional Law § 115 (1984 & Supp. 1996) (discussing legislature burdening
or Interfering with a judicial function).
11. County of Mendocino, 13 Cal. 4th at 61-66, 913 P.2d at 1056-60, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 847-51. An inherent power is a power within the scope of the branch's authority
which has not necessarily been expressly authorized by the legislature or the consti-
tution. 1d. at 57, 913 P.2d at 1054, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845. See generally 13 CAL. Juim
3D Constitutional Law § 108 (1989 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the inherent powers of
the judicial branch).
12. County of Mendocino, 13 Cal. 4th at 61-62, 913 P.2d at 1057-58, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 847-48; see CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 133-136 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996) (detailing the
business days and holidays of the court system). See generally 37 CAL JUI. 3D Holi-
days § 15 (1989 & Supp. 1996) (discussing judicial holidays).
13. County of Mendocino, 13 Cal. 4th at 62-63, 913 P.2d at 1057-58, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 848 (citing People v. Soto, 65 Cal. 621, 4 P. 664 (1884) (recognizing the legisla-
ture's authority in designating holidays); Matter of Smith, 152 Cal. 566, 93 P. 191
(1907) (reasoning that the framers of the constitution did not intend to bar the leg-
islature from regulating holidays of the courts)).
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been upheld as a valid reason for a legal holiday." Finally, the court
asserted that the history of the California Constitution affirms the
drafter's intent to render control of legal holiday regulation to the legisla-
ture.1" Therefore, the court concluded that regulation of the operational
hours of the courts does not lie exclusively with the judicial branch."
. Justice George further stated that the power to determine legal holi-
days does not interfere with the "integrity of independence of the judicial
process."" Citing valid regulations previously enacted by the legislative
and executive branches affecting public access to the court system, the
supreme court dismissed the trial court's contention that the interest in
public access to the court system requires the judiciary's exclusive au-
thority over court closures. 8
The court concluded that while the judiciary possesses the power to
ensure effective operation of the courts, 9 that power is not exclusive to
the judiciary,' and the legislature is not foreclosed from enacting sec-
14. County of Mendocino, 13 Cal. 4th at 63, 913 P.2d at 1057-58, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
847 (citing Diepenbrock v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. 597, 95 P. 1121 (1908) (allowing a
closure of the courts due to the fiscal situation)).
15. County of Mendocino, 13 Cal. 4th at 63-64, 913 P.2d at 1058-59, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 848-50. The 1879 California Constitution stated that courts should always be open
except for holidays and weekends. Id. at 63, 913 P.2d at 1058, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848.
This clause was deleted in 1966, however, because the framers wanted to leave this
area of regulation to the legislature. Id. at 64, 913 P.2d at 1058, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
848.
16. Id. at 65, 913 P.2d at 1059, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 850.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 66, 913 P.2d at 1060, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 850-51. "The legislative and exec-
utive branches are necessarily and centrally involved in the formulation of a great
variety of measures that vitally affect the public's 'access to justice' through the
judicial system, from determining the number and location of new judgeships and
courthouses to establishing which court-related expenses should be financed at the
state level and which at the local leveL" Id. See generally 13 CAL. Ju. 3D Constitu-
tional Law § 107 (1989 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the extent and limit of the
judiciary's independence); 13 CAL JuR. 3D Constitutional Law § 109 (1989 & Supp.
1996) (distinguishing between judicial and legislative powers); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AmERiCAN CONSTmUONAL LAW §§ 2.1-.2 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the balancing of the
independence and interdependence of the three branches of government).
19. County of Mendocino, 13 Cal. 4th at 54-58, 913 P.2d at 1051-54, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 842-45.
20. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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tion 68108.21 Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal was re-
versed and section 68108 was held facially constitutional.'
B. Chief Justice Lucas' Concurring Opinion
While Chief Justice Lucas concurred with the majority, he disagreed
with the mjority's failure to question the legislature's authority to per-
mit each county individually to determine the need for furlough days.'
Chief Justice Lucas argued that the issue should have been addressed
because it appeared on the face of the statute and was mentioned in the
court of appeal decision.'
I. IMPACT
Because the court limited consideration of the issue to the facial con-
stitutionality of the statute,' many issues remain unresolved. For exam-
ple, it is unclear whether the implementation of section 68108 will enable
the courts to fulfill their constitutional duties.' This is an especially in-
teresting issue because each county individually implements this regula-
tion.
Additionally, an exception to section 68108 allowing courts to remain
in session in an emergency remains untested,' and therefore, courts
may attempt to escape the application of this holding by declaring judi-
cial emergencies due to heavy caseloads.
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court held that a reasonable legislative action
regulating an inherent judicial power does not violate the separation of
powers doctrine if the function of the judicial branch is not defeated or
21. County of Mendocino, 13 Cal. 4th at 60-61, 913 P.2d at 1056, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
847.
22. Id, at 66, 913 P.2d at 1060, 51 CaL Rptr. 2d at 851.
23. Id, at 66-67, 913 P.2d at 1060-61, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 851 (Lucas, CJ., concur-
ring).
24. Id. at 67, 913 P.2d at 1060, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 851 (Lucas, CJ., concurring).
25. Id. at 59.61, 913 P.2d at 1055-56, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 846-47.
26. Id. at 59-60, 913 P.2d at 1055-56, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 846-47. The trial court only
considered the facial constitutionality of section 68108. I& at 51, 913 P.2d at 1050, 51
Cal Rptr. 2d at 840-41. Therefore, the supreme court could not consider whether the
statute, "as applied," would hinder the ability of the courts in performing their constitu-
tional functions. Id. at 59 n.7, 913 P.2d at 846 n.7, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 1055 n.7.
27. Id. at 49, 913 P.2d at 1048, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839.
28. Id, at 60, 913 P.2d at 1056, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 846-47.
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materially impaired.' While the court affrmed an established standard
for legislative regulation of an inherent judicial power,'O the effects of
this application are yet to be determined.
KIRSTEN C. INK
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29. Id, at 58-59, 913 P.2d at 1054-55, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845.
30. Id at 60-61, 913 P.2d at 1056, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 847.
M. COUNTIES
A sales tax proposed by the transportation authority is a
"special tax" applied by a "special district" within the
meaning of the statutory initiative; thus, the tax was
subject to a statutory requirement that local special taxes
be approved by a two-thirds vote among the local elector-
ate. The proposed sales tax received less than the two-
thirds vote required by statute and was held invalid
because it failed to satisfy the threshold statutory re-
quirement: Santa Clara County Local Transportation
Authority v. Guardino.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino1
the California Supreme Court addressed whether the sales tax proposed
by the transportation authority, petitioner, was subject to either (1) the
two-thirds voter approval requirement of Government Code section
53722, as contained in Proposition 62, which was adopted in 1986, or
(2) the two-thirds voter approval requirement imposed by Article XnI A,
section four, of the California Constitution,' as contained in Proposition
13. The court further considered whether the initiatives containing such
voter approval requirements are constitutional. The supreme court re-
versed the court of appeal's decision,' holding that the sales tax pro-
1. 11 Cal 4th 220, 902 P.2d 225, 45 Cal Rptr. 2d 207 (1995). Justice Mosk delivered
the majority opinion, in which Justices Arabian, Baxter, George, and Kennard con-
curred. Id. at 226-61, 902 P.2d at 228-51, 45 Cal Rptr. 2d at 210-33. Chief Justice Lucas
wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 261-69, 902 P.2d at 251-56, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 233-38
(Lucas, C.J., dissenting). Justice Werdegar also wrote a dissenting opinion. Id, at 269-
71, 902 P.2d at 256-58, 45 Cal Rptr. 2d at 238-40 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
2. Section 53722 provides: "No local government or district may impose any special
tax unless and until such special tax is submitted to the electorate of the local govern-
ment, or district, and approved by a two-thirds vote of the voters voting in an election
on the issue." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53722 (West Supp. 1996). See generally 9 B.E.
WrrN, SUMMARY oF' CAUFoRNiA LAW, Taxation § 109 (9th ed. 1989) (summarizing the
restrictive effects of adopting Proposition 62 on the imposition of taxes by local gov-
ernments and districts).
3. CAL CONST. art XIII A, § 4. The relevant portion of this section states that "Cit-
ies, Counties, and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of
such district, may impose special taxes on such district. . . ." Guardino, 11 Cal 4th
at 231, 902 P.2d at 231, 45 Cal Rptr. 2d at 213. See generalLy 9 B.E. WrmIN, SUMMARY
OF CALuORNIA LAw, Taxation §§ 107-122 (9th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1996) (summarizing the
provisions of Proposition 13 and their implementation).
4. Santa Clara County Local Transp. Auth. v. Guardino, 34 Cal App. 4th 858, 24
Cal Rptr. 2d 854 (1993).
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posed by the petitioner was invalid under Proposition 62, because it re-
ceived less than the two-thirds vote required for approval under section
53722.'
I. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Prefacing its analysis, the njority opinion stated that traditionally the
California Supreme Court had postponed the consideration of constitu-
tional issues where statutory relief was determined to be adequate.6 Ac-
cordingly, the majority stated tha because the statutory relief in this case
was adequate, and therefore dispositive, "a constitutional decision would
have been unnecessary and therefore inappropriate. "7
5. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 226-61, 902 P.2d at 228-61, 45 Cal Rptr. 2d at 210-33.
In Guardino, the sales tax at issue was authorized by the enactment of the Local
Transportation Authority and Improvement Act, which declared that "federal and state
funding... is inadequate" to meet local trasportation needs and provided for taxa-
tion and bond-issuing measures to "raise additional local revenues." Id at 227, 902 P.2d
at 228, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 210. Pursuant to the Act, the Santa Clara County Board of
Supervisors created the Santa Clara Local Transportation Authority, which adopted an
ordinance that imposed a countywide sales tax and empowered the petitioner to issue
bonds payable from the revenues of the sales tax. Id, at 227-28, 902 P.2d at 228-29, 45
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211. The revenues were required to be used to satisfy the stated local
transportation needs. AL Subsequently, the proposed ordinance was placed on the Gen-
eral Election Ballot and was approved by 54.1% of the voters. Id. at 228, 902. P.2d at
229, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211. Following the election, petitioner adopted a resolution to
issue bonds pursuant to the Act, ordering Its auditor-comptroller, Carl Guardino (re-
spondent), to sign the bonds to be issued. Id, Guardino refused to do so unless the
taxation scheme was determined to be valid. Id, The court of appeal denied
petitioner's prayer for a writ of mandate compelling respondent to sign the bonds and
held the tax scheme invalid under Proposition 13. lM
6. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 228-31, 902 P.2d at 229-31, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211-13.
But see Rider v. County of San Diego, 1 Cal. 4th 1, 820 P.2d 1000, 2 Cal Rptr. 2d 490
(1991) (opting to address only the constitutional ground and holding a similar tax
scheme invalid when challenged on the same constitutional and statutory grounds as in
the instant case). See, e.g., City of Woodlake v. Logan, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 282 Cal.
Rptr. 27 (1991) and City of Westminster v. County of Orange, 204 Cal. App. 3d 623,
251 Cal Rptr. 511 (1988) (holding other sections of Proposition 62 unconstitutional, ex-
pressing the court's uncertainty as to the constitutionality of California Government
Code section 53722, and recognizing the necessity of a prompt resolution of that is-
sue).
7. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 231-32, 902 P.2d at 231, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213 (quot-
ing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485 ,U.S. 439, 446 (1988)). Al-
though the statutory ground was dispositive in the instant case, the court found it nec-
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1. Within the meaning of the statutory initiative, the sales tax
imposed was a special tax and petitioner was a district.
As a basis for its analysis, the majority stated that on its face section
53722 invalidated the sales tax if it was a special tax within the meaning
of that section and if petitioner was a district as set forth in section
53722.8
First, the court addressed whether the sales tax imposed in the instant
case was a special tax within the meaning of section 53722.? The court
relied on Rider v. County of San Diego" to narrowly define a special
tax as a tax imposed for a specific purpose.11 The narrow purpose of
the tax in Guardino was for funding "local transportation maintenance
and improvement needs," conditioning payment of the proceeds to the
satisfaction of such needs.12
Finding the instant case sufficiently analogous to Rider, the court
concluded that the sales tax imposed in the instant case was a special
tax within the meaning of section 53722.13
essary to determine the constitutionality of Government Code section 53722. Id. at 238-
61, 902 P.2d at 236-51, 45 Cal. Rptir. 2d at 218-33 (finding section 53722 constitutional).
8. Guaditno, 11 Cal. 4th at 231, 902 P.2d at 231, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213. Because
of its two-thirds voter approval requirement and because the proposed sales tax was
approved by only 54.1% of the voters, section 53722 would invalidate the tax if the
conditions following were met (1) the tax must have been a special tax within the
meaning of section 53722, and (2) petitioner must have been a "district" within the
meaning of section 53722. Id.; see supra note 2 (setting forth the conditions that must
be satisfied to apply section 53722).
9. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 231, 902 P.2d at 231, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213.
10. 1 Cal. 4th 1, 820 P.2d 1000, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490 (1991).
11. Id. at 15, 820 P.2d at 1009, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499. The court in Rider further
construed the term special tax to mean a tax "levied to fund a specific governmental
project or program.. . ." Id.
12. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 232, 902 P.2d at 232, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214 (quoting
CAL PuB. UTL CODE § 180001(c) (Deering 1997)); CAL GOVT CODE § 53721 (West
1983 & Supp. 1996) (providing that special taxes are defined as "taxes imposed for
specific purposes"); cf City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 57,
648 P.2d 935, 940, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713, 718 (1982) (constming the term special taxes to
mean "taxes which are levied for a specific purpose" and not a levy "to be utilized for
general governmental purposes").
13. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 232, 902 P.2d at 232, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214. In Rider,
the court held that the sales tax imposed by the San Diego County Regional Justice
Facility Financing Agency "for the purpose of financing the construction and operation
of criminal detention and courthouse facilities" was subject to the two-thirds voter
approval requirement of Proposition 13 because the tax was a special tax and the
Agency was a "district" within the meanings set forth in Proposition 13. Rider, 1 Cal.
4th at 11, 820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. Therefore, the court held that the
tax was invalid due to the fact that it was only approved by a majority of the voters.
Id. at 13, 820 P.2d at 1007, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498.
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Second, the court considered whether petitioner was a "district" within
the meaning of section 53722. Relying on the plain meaning of the term
"district" as defined by Proposition 62 and the legislative intent of the
drafters of Proposition 62, the court stated that a district is an "agency of
the state, formed pursuant to general law or special act, for the local
performance of governmental or proprietary functions within limited
boundaries.""
Applying the foregoing definition to the instant case, the majority con-
cluded that "petitioner is an agency of the state formed pursuant to gen-
eral law (Pub. Util. Code, § 180000 et seq.) for the local performance of a
governmental function (raising tax revenues) within limited boundaries
(Santa Clara County)."' Therefore, on its face, section 53722 was appli-
cable because petitioner was determined to be a "district" within the
meaning of the statute.
2. Because the statutory initiative was constitutional, the sales tax
was invalid when it failed to satisfy the voting requirement of
section 53722.
Next, the majority addressed whether the voter approval requirement
of section 53722 was a referendum within the meaning of the constitu-
tion.17 The majority distinguished Proposition 62 from a constitutional
14. Guardino, 11 CaL 4th at 233, 902 P.2d at 232, 45 CaL Rptr. 2d at 214; see CAL
GOVT CODE § 53720(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1996). But see Los Angeles County Transp.
Comm'n v. Richmond, 31 CaL. 3d 197, 205-08, 643 P.2d 941, 94547, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324,
32830 (1982) (construing the term special district as used in Proposition 13 to mean
"only districts that are authorized to levy a property tax"). In the instant case, petition-
er argued that its lack of authority to levy a property tax prevented it from being
classified as a special district. Guardino, 11 CaL 4th at 223, 902 P.2d at 232, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 214. Based on the contention that Proposition 62 intended to adopt the
Richmond construction of special district as the definition of "district," petitioner ar-
gued that it was not subject to the section 53722 voting requirement. Id. The court
rejected the argument, holding that Proposition 62 applied to all "districts," not just
special districts. Id,
15. Guardino, 11 CaL 4th at 233, 902 P.2d at 232-33, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 238-54, 902 P.2d at 236-46, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218-28. The court stated
that the constitutional referendum was "'the right reserved to the people to adopt or
reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body, and which, in
most cases, would without action on the part of the electors become a law.'" Id. at
241, 902 P.2d at 237-38, 45 CaL Rptr. 2d at 219-20 (citing Referendum Comm v. City
of Hermosa Beach, 184 Cal. App. 3d 152, 157, 229 Cal. Rptr. 51, 54 (1986) (emphasis
added) (quoting Whitmore v. Carr, 2 CaL App. 2d 590, 592 (1934))). Furthermore, the
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referendum as follows: (1) the voter approval requirement of section
53722 was a condition precedent to the enactment of a sales tax,
whereas a constitutional referendum was invoked only after a statute
had been enacted;"8 (2) a statute subject to Proposition 62 was not en-
acted until it was submitted to and approved by the local electorate,
whereas a statute subject to the constitutional referendum was automati-
cally enacted unless the voters themselves petitioned to prevent its en-
actment; 9 and (3) during the entire legislative process before the tax
was submitted to the voters, Proposition 62 described the tax as merely
"proposed," whereas a referendum operated only after the legislative
process was completed.' For the foregoing reasons, the majority con-
cluded that Proposition 62 was not a constitutional referendum.'
Furthermore, the majority stated that the legislature's characterization
of a statutory initiative as a referendum was not necessarily dispositive
of the fact that the initiative functioned as a referendum.'
court noted that the California Constitution defines referendum and sets forth excep-
tions to its applicability- "The referendum is the power of the electors to approve or
reject statutes or parts of statutes except ... statutes providing for tax levies or ap-
propriations for usual current expenses of the State." Id, at 238-39, 902 P.2d at 236, 45
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218 (quoting CAL CONsT. art. I, § 9(a)). See generaUy 7 B.E. WMaN,
SUARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 122 (9th ed. 1988) (summarizing
the scope of the referendum power and its constitutional basis); 42 AM. JUn. 2D Initia-
tive and Refermdum § 15 (2d ed. 1969) (discussing taxes and appropriation measures
exempt from referendum).
18. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 240, 902 P.2d at 237, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 219. See gen-
eraUy 38 CAL JUn. 3D Initiative and Referendum §§ 56-63 (1977 & Supp. 1996) (dis-
cussing the procedural requirements and scope of the referendum power as defined by
the constitution).
19. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 240, 902 P.2d at 237, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 219. See gen-
em/ly 82 CJ.S. Statutes §§ 115-161 (1953) (discussing the purpose and scope of the
initiative and referendum powers).
20. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 240-41, 902 P.2d at 237, 45 CaL Rptr. 2d at 219. The
court further stated that the tax was merely "proposed" at the time it was submitted
to the electorate for a vote; therefore, the tax could not yet have been "enacted," an
essential element of a constitutional referendum. Id. at 240-41, 902 P.2d at 237-38, 45
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 219-20. According to the court, a tax could not have been considered
"enacted" unless and until it was submitted to and approved by the voters. Id.; see
CAL GOVT CODE §§ 53722, 53723 (West 1983 & Supp. 1996).
21. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 240, 902 P.2d at 237, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 219.
22. Id. at 242-43, 902 P.2d at 238-39, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220-21. The court stated
that its use of the "referendum" label in referring to voter approval requirements smi-
lar to the one in Proposition 62 was merely for convenience. IdA; see, e.g., City 'of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137 (1971); Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1970),
vacated, 403 U.S. 915 (1971); Rossi v. Brown, 9 Cal. 4th 688, 889 P.2d 557, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 363 (1995).
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Notwithstanding petitioners contrary contention, the majority stated
that the policy reasons behind the legislature's decision to except tax
levies from the referendum power, as set forth in Rider, were not appli-
cable to the Proposition 62 voter approval requirement.23
The majority then found that article XIII, section 24, of the California
Constitutionu4 authorized the legislature to grant local governments the
power to impose local taxes.? In addition, the court stated that "[t]he
Legislature's authority to grant taxing power to local governments,
moreover, includes the authority to prescribe the terms and conditions
under which local governments may exercise that power."' Applied to
23. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 245-46, 902 P.2d at 240-41, 45 CaL Rptr. 2d at 222-23.
The main reason for the tax levy exception is to prevent the interference with or dis-
ruption of the administration of a state's fiscal powers and policies. Ild, (citing Geiger
v. Board of Supervisors, 48 Cal. 2d 832, 313 P.2d 645 (1957)). Furthermore, in Rider,
the court stated that the policy Justifications for the exception were not violated by
the voter approval requirement due to the fact that the local legislative body was
aware that it lacked the power to levy the tax until it was approved by the electorate.
Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 24r-46, 902 P.2d at 240-41, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 222-23 (citing
Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 23, 820 P.2d at 1014, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504 (George, J., concurring)).
See generally 7 B.E. Wrrxw, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNI, LAW, Constitutional Law § 123
(9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the prohibition against referenda on tax lev-
ies); 42 AM. Jut. 2D Initiative and Referendum § 15 (2d ed. 1969 & Supp. 1993) (set-
ting forth the tax levying exception to the referendum power); Richard A. Chesley,
Comment, The Current Use of the Initiative and Referendum in Ohio and Other
States, 53 U. CiN. L REV. 541 (1984) (discussing the exceptions to the referendum
power).
24. CAL CONST. art. XIII, § 24. This section provides: MThe Legislature may not im-
pose taxes for local purposes but may authorize local governments to impose them."
Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 247, 902 P.2d at 242, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 224. See generally 9
B.E. WnTN, SUMMARY OF CALFORA LAW, Taxation § 101 (9th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1996)
(stating that the legislature cannot impose local taxes for local purposes, but may vest
such power in local governments); 13 CAL JUn. 3D Constitutional Law § 176 (1989)
(stating that under article 13, section 24, "[t]he whole subject of county and municipal
taxes for local purposes is relegated to local authorities, and the legislature has no
power to impose any tax whatever within those territories for local purposes"); 51 CAL
Jun. 3D Public Improvements §§ 5-8 (1979 & Supp. 1996) (stating that the legislature
may exercise its power to levy taxes only through its delegation to municipalities and
other local bodies).
25. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 246-54, 902 P.2d at 241-46, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 223-28.
26. Id. at 248, 902 P.2d at 242, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 224. See, e.g., CAL REV. & TAX.
CODE §§ 9501-9507 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997) (placing conditions on authorization of
counties to levy a motor vehicle fuel tax for local transportation purposes); CAL REV.
& TAX CODE §§ 7287-7287.10 (West 1997) (placing conditions on authorization of local
governments to impose a sales tax on certain consumer products for purposes of graf-
fiti prevention). Furthermore, the delegated power may be "revoked, modified, or limit-
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the instant case, the majority concluded that the voter approval require-
ment contained in Proposition 62 was within the scope of the
legislature's authority to place conditions on the exercise of local taxing
power.' Therefore, the majority held that section 53722 was constitu-
tional.'
The majority next addressed whether the local electorate could con-
stitutionally enact Proposition 62 by initiative. The court relied primarily
on article H, section 8(a), of the constitution" to conclude that section
53722 was within the scope of the initiative power.'
3. Section 53722 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
As its final point of analysis, the majority discredited petitioner's claim
that section 53722 denied the proponents of the tax equal protection of
the laws."' To do so, the court stated that (1) the applicable rule was
ed at any time" by the legislature. 16 EUGENE McQuILLN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATnONS § 44.05 (3d rev. ed. 1994). See generally 13 CAL Jun. 3D Constitutional Law
§§ 170-172 (1989 & Supp. 1996) (summarizing the extent of the legislature's power to
tax and the means by which the legislature may determine the mode of levying, as-
sessing, and collecting the tax).
27. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 250, 902 P.2d at 244, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 226. The
court added that "[if the local government chooses to exercise that power [to tax fol-
lowing the legislature's delegation], the [liegislature may require it to take several steps
in order to impose the tax." Id, According to the court, a voter approval requirement
is one such step. Id.
28. Id. at 252-53, 902 P.2d at 245, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227.
29. CAL CONST. art. U1, § 8(a). The initiative power was defined as the constitutional
power of the electorate "to propose statutes.. . and to adopt or reject them," and
was coextensive with the legislature's power to enact statutes. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th
at 253, 902 P.2d at 246, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 228. See generally 7 B.E. WrrIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 121 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (summarz-
ing the scope of the initiative power and its constitutional basis); 38 CAL JUI. 3D Ini-
tiative and Referendum §§ 40-55 (1977 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the constitutional
basis, scope, and procedural requirements for the adoption of ordinances by initiative);
42 AM. JUR. 2D Initiative and Referendum §§ 1-66 (1969 & Supp. 1993) (summarizing
the initiative and referendum powers).
30. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 254, 902 P.2d at 246, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 228. See gen-
erally David B. Magleby, Governing by Initiative: Let the Voters Decide? An As-
sessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. Cow. L REv. 13 (1995)
(discussing the procedural requirements for exercising the initiative power); James E.
Castello, Comment, The Limits of Popular Sovereignty: Using the Initiative Pouwr to
Control Legislative Procedure, 74 CAL L REv. 491 (1986) (discussing the initiative pow-
er as a limitation on the legislature's authority to enact legislation).
31. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 254.61, .902 P.2d at 246-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 228-33;
see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally 13 CAL JUn. 3D Constitutional Law
§§ 183-187 (1989 & Supp. 1996) (stating the fundamental principle of taxation that a
tax must be equal in Its burdens and uniform in its operation).
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that "so long as such provisions do not discriminate against or authorize
discrimination against any identifiable class, they do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause,"' and (2) under Gordon, the electorate voting
on the tax initiative did not constitute an "identifiable class.' 3 There-
fore, the court concluded that section 53722 did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.'
In sum, the court determined that section 53722 applied to petitioner
and was constitutional. As a result, the sales tax imposed by petitioner
was invalid because its 54.1% approval vote failed to satisfy the two-
thirds voter approval requirement contained in section 53722.1
B. Chief Justice Lucas' Dissenting Opinion
In a separate dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Lucas contended that
the tax levy exception to the referendum power was tantamount to "a
declaration of policy against subjecting [tax] legislation... to a vote of
the people.' Since Proposition 62 and its voter approval requirement in
section 53722 purported to condition the assessment of local taxes on
electorate approval, Chief Justice Lucas opined that Proposition 62 was a
referendum that violated the constitution's prohibition against tax-levying
referenda 37 Therefore, pursuant to his finding that section 53722 was
32. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 256, 902 P.2d at 247-48, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 229-30
(quoting Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 7 (1971)).
33. Id. at 258, 902 P.2d at 249, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 231. See generally Alan Howard
& Bruce Howard, The Dilemma of the Voting Rights Act-Recognizing the Emerging
Political Equality Norm, 83 COLUM. L REV. 1615 (1983) (discussing Gordon v. Lance
and supermajority voting requirements).
34. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 254-61, 902 P.2d at 246-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 228-33.
See generally Robert Jerome Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 Gao. WASH.
L REV. 261 (1990) (outlining the effects of equal protection jurisprudence on the
legislature's power to tax).
35. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 226-61, 902 P.2d at 228-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 210-33.
36. Id. at 261-69, 902 P.2d at 251-56, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 233-38 (Lucas, C.J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Geiger v. Board of Supervisors, 48 Cal. 2d 832, 836, 313 P.2d 545, 547
(1957)); see supra note 23 and accompanying text (setting forth the justifications for
the tax levy limitation on the referendum power). Because voter disapproval of the tax
initiative would have prevented its enactment, Chief Justice Lucas argued that the
Proposition 62 voting requirement rendered the tax "a nullity in the same manner as a
constitutionally forbidden referendum." Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 262, 902 P.2d at 252,
45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234 (Lucas, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Lucas further contended
that the Proposition 62 two-thirds vote requirement violated the constitutional provision
requiring only a simple majority vote to approve initiatives and referenda. Id. (Lucas,
CJ ., dissenting); see CAL CONST. art H, § 10(a).
37. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 262, 902 P.2d at 251, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 233 (Lucas,
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unconstitutional because it functioned as a tax-levying referendum, Chief
Justice Lucas concluded that petitioner's tax was not invalidated by its
failure to receive a two-thirds approval vote.'
C. Justice Werdegar's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Werdegar, in a separate dissenting opinion, stated that Propo-
sition 62 had the same effect as a referendum, notwithstanding the
majority's contention that Proposition 62 did not "literally" constitute a
referendum. According to Justice Werdegar, classification of Proposi-
tion 62 was irrelevant because the proposition was an "effort to evade
the constitutional rule that 'statutes providing for tax levies' are not sub-
ject to referendum."4 Therefore, Justice Werdegar concluded that sec-
tion 53722 was unconstitutional because it effectively granted to the
electorate the "equivalent of a power denied to them in the [constitu-
tion].""
M. IMPACT
Prior to Guardino, the supreme court had not settled the constitution-
ality of supermajority voter approval requirements as they pertained to
local tax initiatives imposed by local governments.' The majority in
Guardino, finding that the two-thirds voter approval requirement of sec-
tion 53722 was constitutional, held that the local sales tax imposed by
petitioner was invalid because it received only a 54.1% approval vote.'
Although its holding appeared to solidify a previously unsettled area of
the law, the Guardino court's analysis is neither beyond criticism, nor
incapable of producing negative results.
First, as stated in Chief Justice Lucas's dissenting opinion, the court's
holding could have a crippling effect on the financing and implementa-
tion of local projects and improvements: "Given the general unpopularity
of new tax measures (a factor that undoubtedly led to the initial adop-
tion of the constitutional prohibition against tax referenda), it is likely
CJ., dissenting).
38. Id at 269, 902 P.2d at 256, 45 CaL Rptr. 2d at 238 (Lucas, C., dissenting).
39. Id. at 269-71, 902 P.2d at 256-58, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 238-40 (Werdegar, J., dis-
senting).
40. Id, at 270, 902 P.2d at 256, 45 Cal Rptr. 2d at 239 (Werdegar, J., dissenting)
(quoting CAL CONST. art. H, § 9(a)).
41. Id. at 271, 902 P.2d at 258, 45 CaL Rptr. 2d at 240 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 226-27, 902 P.2d at 228, 45 Cal. Rplr. 2d at 211.
43. Id at 238-54, 902 P.2d at 236-46, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218-28.
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that few, if any, proposed local tax measures will meet the required two-
thirds voter approval."
Second, the vote required by Proposition 62 would have a similar ef-
fect as a referendum in that it could severely impede the ability of the
local government to exercise its fiscal powers." In fact, Justice
Werdegar stated that even more significant interference could result from
Proposition 62 because it "requires a vote on every new tax, even if there
would not exist sufficient interest to place a particular tax on the bal-
lot.""
IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to Guardino, uncertainty existed as to whether supermajority
voter approval requirements, such as section 53722 contained in Propo-
sition 62, were (1) constitutional under the legislature's power to dele-
gate the authority to local governments to impose local taxes, and (2)
unconstitutional under the prohibition against tax-levying referenda. Con-
cluding that the former construction was proper, the majority found the
two-thirds voter approval requirement of section 53722 constitutional.4
In the instant case, section 53722 applied to the special tax proposed by
petitioner, which was a "district" within the meaning of the statute.'
Therefore, section 53722 rendered petitioner's proposed sales tax invalid
due to its failure to receive the required approval of two-thirds of the
voters."
JOSEPH FOSS
44. Id. at 263, 902 P.2d at 252, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234 (Lucas, C.J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 271, 902 P.2d at 257, 45 CaL Rptr. 2d at 239-40 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Werdegar, the effect of such an interference would result in the
postponement of fiscal planning until subsequent elections. Id. (Werdegar, J., dissent-
ing).
46. Id. at 271, 902 P.2d at 257, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
47. Id, at 238-54, 902 P.2d at 236-46, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218-28.
48. Id, at 231-38, 902 P.2d at 228-36, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213-18.
49. Id. at 261, 902 P.2d at 251, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 233.
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IV. CRmAL LAW
The 1986 amendment to Penal Code section 664(a) cre-
ates a penalty provision rather than a delineation of
degrees of attempted murder; therefore, a defendant can
be retried on the issue of premeditation and deliberation:
People v. Bright.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Bright,' the California Supreme Court examined whether
the 1986 amendment to Penal Code section 664(a),2 which imposes a
longer prison sentence on individuals who attempt to commit murder
with premeditation and deliberation, creates a higher degree of attempt-
ed murder or is merely a penalty provision.' The trial court found that
1. 12 Cal. 4th 652, 909 P.2d 1354, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732 (1996). Justice George deliv-
ered the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Arabian, Baxter,
and Werdegar concurred. Id. at 655-71, 909 P.2d at 1355-66, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733-44.
Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 671-83, 909 P.2d at 1366-74, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 744-52 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard wrote a separate dissenting
opinion. Id. at 683-93, 909 P.2d at 1374-80, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 752-58 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting).
2. As amended, section 664(a) of the Penal Code reads in relevant part
(a) If the offense so attempted is punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison, the person guilty of that attempt is punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison for one-half the term of imprisonment prescribed upon a con-
viction of the offense so attempted; provided, however, that if the crime
attempted is wilfI, deliberate, and premeditated murder, as defined in Sec-
tion 189, the person guilty of that attempt shall be punishable by imprison-
ment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole; ... [tihe
additional term provided in this section for attempted wild, deliberate,
and premeditated murder shall not be imposed unless the fact that the at-
tempted murder was wiful, deliberate, and premeditated is charged in the
accusatory pleading and admitted or found to be true by the trier of fact.
CAL PENAL CODE § 664(a) (West Supp. 1996) (emphasis added to indicate changes
made by 1986 amendment).
3. Bright, 12 Cal. 4th at 656, 909 P.2d at 1355, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733. In Bright,
a police officer stopped the defendant for defective brake lights. Id. at 657, 909 P.2d at
1356, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 734. The defendant pulled over, and the officer approached
the vehicle on the driver's side. Id. The defendant aimed a .357 magnum at the officer
and fired six rounds, hitting the deputy in the waist, abdomen, and leg. Id. The officer
survived the shooting, and the defendant was arrested. Id. The defendant was charged
with "willfully, deliberately, and premeditatedly attempt[ing] to murder" the officer. Id.
The jury convicted the defendant of attempted murder, but was unable to agree on the
premeditation allegation. Id. at 658, 909 P.2d at 1357, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 736. A mistri-
al was declared on the issue of premeditation, and the case was set for retrial. Id. The
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the premeditation allegation asserting that he had
already been tried and found guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted murder.
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the 1986 amendment created a higher degree of attempted murder, and
therefore, retrial on the issue of premeditation and deliberation was
barred by double jeopardy.' The court of appeal reversed, stating that
attempted murder is not divided into degrees.' Upholding the decision of
the court of appeal, the California Supreme Court agreed that the amend-
ment creates a penalty provision and does not divide attempted murder
into degrees. Consequently, the supreme court held that retrying a defen-
dant on the issue of premeditation and deliberation would not be barred
by double jeopardy.6
II. TREATMENT
A Majority Opinion
1. The legislative intent in writing the 1986 amendment to Penal
Code section 664(a) was to create a penalty provision.
The court began its opinion by noting the differences between degrees
of a crime and enhancement or penalty provisions.7 When a crime is
divided into degrees, conviction on a greater or lesser included offense
comprises the "same offense" under double jeopardy provisions, and
retrial is barred! The court contrasted this with a penalty provision that
Id. at 658-59, 909 P.2d at 1357-58, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 735-36.
4. Id. at 659, 909 P.2d at 1258, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 735.
5. Id. at 660, 909 P.2d at 1358, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 736.
6. Id. at 656-57, 909 P.2d at 1356, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 734.
7. Id. at 660-61, 909 P.2d at 1358-59, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 736-37.
8. Id. at 660, 909 P.2d at 1359, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737; see also Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161, 169-70 (1977) (holding that a prior conviction for the lesser offense of
joyriding bars a subsequent conviction for auto theft); Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.
3d 503, 646 P.2d 809, 183 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1982) (noting that courts must allow the jury
to give a partial verdict of acquittal on a greater offense when. the jury is deadlocked
only on an uncharged lesser included offense); People v. Lohbauer, 29 Cal. 3d 364, 627
P.2d 183, 173 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1981) (holding defendants conviction on a lesser charge
was an implied acquittal of the greater charge). See generaUy David F. Abele, Jury
Deliberations and the Lesser Included Offense: Getting the Courts Back in Step, 23
U.C. DAVIS L REv. 375 (1989); 1 B.E. WrrmaN & NORMAN L EPSrMIN, CALPMRNIA CRIMI-
NAL LAW § 326 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the barring of multiple prosecu-
tions in lesser included offenses); 20 CAL JuR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 2322, 2332 (1985
& Supp. 1996) (discussing the doctrine of lesser included offenses and consequences of
a jury's failure to agree on an unchanged lesser included offense).
The double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that
no person will be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense, was made applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
1107
imposes a greater penalty when the crime is committed in specific cir-
cumstances.9 A conviction or acquittal on an underlying offense does not
bar a retrial during the penalty phase.' °
The court then reviewed the history of Penal Code section 664 to bet-
ter determine the intent of the legislature in amending the legislation."
The court examined the language used in the amendment and deter-
mined that it was language typically used in sentence enhancement pen-
alty provisions. 2 Further, the court noted that nothing in the language
of the statute expressly created degrees of attempted murder.3 Conse-
quently, the court concluded that the legislature intended to create en-
hancement penalty provisions and not degrees of attempted murder. l4
(1969). California also incorporated a similar provision in the state constitution. CAL
CoNsT. art. I, § 5. For a discussion on the early history of the double jeopardy clause,
see Justice Marshall's opinion in United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340-353 (1975).
For a general discussion of the double jeopardy clause, see Paul G. Flynn, Judicial
Sentencing Error Thomas v. Morris and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 16 PEPP. L REv.
613 (1989). See generally Richard Finacom, Comment, Successive Prosecutions and the
Continuing Oriminal Enterprise: the Double Jeopardy Analysis in Garrett v. United
States, 13 HASTNGS CONST. LQ. 785 (1986).
9. Bright, 12 Cal. 4th at 661, 909 P.2d at 1359, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737. For a gen-
eral discussion of sentence enhancements, see 3 B.E. WrrIu & NORMAN L EPSTEIN,
CALuOmu CRmaNAL LAW §§ 1473-1479 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1996).
10. Bright, 12 Cal. 4th at 661, 909 P.2d at 1359, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737; see also
People v. Bryant, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1584, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601 (1992) (allowing defen-
dant to be retried on enhancement to a rape charge after defendant plead no contest
to rape); People v. Guillen, 25 Cal. App. 4th 756, 759, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653, 655 (1994)
(holding that retrial on sentence enhancement in a drug possession case was not
barred by double jeopardy); People v. Schultz, 5 Cal. App. 4th 563, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269
(1992) (holding that defendant could be retried on enhancement after the jury was
hung as to the enhancement but found him guilty of attempted murder). For a discus-
sion of collateral estoppel issues in sentence enhancement, see Daniel P. Fliflet, Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Survey, 23 PEPP. L REv. 290 (1995) (analyzing People v.
Santamaria).
11. Bright, 12 Cal. 4th at 662, 909 P.2d at 1360, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 738.
12. Id. at 667-68, 909 P.2d at 13634, 49 Cal Rptr. 2d at 741-42. See supra note 2
for the text of Penal Code § 664(a) and indicated changes made by the 1986 amend-
ments.
13. Bright, 12 Cal. 4th at 668, 909 P.2d at 1364, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 742.
14. Id. at 669, 909 P.2d at 1364, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 742. The court noted that the
1986 amendment did not change existing law. Id. In People v. Macias the court re-
jected Macias' contention that treating all those convicted of attempted murder the
same was a violation of due process and held that there are not degrees of attempted
murder. 137 Cal. App. 3d 465, 468-69, 187 Cal. Rptr. 100, 101 (1983); see also People v.
Miller, 6 Cal. App. 4th 873, 879, 8 CaL Rptr. 2d 193, 196 (1992) (noting that attempted
murder is not divided into degrees).
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2. The language of the charging instrument and jury instructions
does not establish degrees of attempted murder.
The court next focused on the trial court's assertion that the language
of the documents charging the defendant with attempted murder, taken
together with the jury instructions, created degrees of attempted mur-
der. 5 The supreme court first rebutted the trial court's finding by em-
phasizing that it is only the legislature that decides if a crime is to be
divided into degrees and not the courts. 6 Furthermore, the supreme
court stated that the purpose of charging documents are only to give the
defendant notice, and not to delineate degrees of murder. 7 Lastly, the
supreme court recognized that jury instructions do not create degrees
of attempted murder." Even if they do, the defendant did not object to
the instructions at trial, and therefore, any objection was waived.'
16. Bright, 12 Cal. 4th at 669, 909 P.2d at 1365, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743. In support
of its finding, the trial court cited People v. Wilson, 224 Cal. App. 2d 738, 37 Cal. Rptr.
42 (1964), overrdWd on other grounds by Kellett v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 822, 409
P.2d 206, 48 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1966). In Wilson, the police went to arrest the defendant
pursuant to a warrant. Id. at 740, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 43. The defendant fled to his
father's house, and when the officer entered the house, the defendant pointed a rifle at
the officer. Id. In two separate complaints, defendant was charged with exhibiting a
firearm and resisting arrest. Id. The relevant issue was whether the first count was a
lesser included.of the second count Id. at 743, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 45. The court found
that the first count was not a lesser included. Id. In making its decision, the court
looked at the language of the accusatory pleading and fairness to the parties. Id.
The California Supreme Court countered the trial court's assertion by citing People
v. Wolcott, 34 Cal. 3d 92, 665 P.2d 520, 192 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1983). Bright, 12 Cal. 4th
at 661, 909 P.2d at 1359, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737. In Wolcott, the court rejected
defendant's contention that assault with a deadly weapon was a lesser included offense
of robbery enhanced by use of a weapon. Id. at 100, 665 P.2d at 525, 192 Cal. Rptr. at
753. Consequently, the Wolcott court discarded the argument that sentence enhancement
allegations in a pleading should be considered in defining lesser included offenses. I.
at 100, 665 P.2d at 525, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 754.
16. Bright, 12 Cal. 4th at 669, 909 P.2d at 1366, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743; see also
People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 668 P.2d 697, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1983) (noting that
the division of crimes into degrees is a legislative function).
17. Bright, 12 Cal. 4th at 670, 909 P.2d at 1365, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743; see also 4
B.E. WmciN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, California Criminal Law § 2060 (2d ed. 1989)
(noting that due process requirements include notice to the accused of the charges
against him).
18. The jury instructions used were CALIIC Nos. 8.66 and 8.67. Bright, 12 Cal. 4th
at 658 & nn.3-4, 909 P.2d at 1357 & nn.3-4, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 735 & nn.3-4; ARNoLD
LEVIN, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL Nos. 361-64 (5th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996)
(dealing with attempt to commit murder).
19. Bright, 12 Cal. 4th at 669-70, 909 P.2d 146566, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743-44.
20. Id. at 671, 909 P.2d at 1366, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 744; see also People v.
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B. Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk contended that the language of
Penal Code section 664 clearly creates degrees of attempted murder.2
To show this, Justice Mosk focused on the language of Penal Code sec-
tion 664(d), which states that "[ilf a crime is divided into degrees, an
attempt to commit the crime may be of any of those degrees.... '
Because murder is a crime divided into degrees,' and because the 1986
amendment to Section 664(a) does not create an exception to section
664(d) for murder, Justice Mosk concluded that Penal Code section
664(d) governs.2'
Justice Mosk further noted that while enhancement or penalty provi-
sions typically add on to a base sentence, the 1986 amendment to Sec-
tion 664(a) of the Penal Code instead imposes a life sentence.' After
discussing the history of Penal Code Section 664 from its enactment in
1872 to present, Justice Mosk ultimately concluded that the legislature
intended for there to be degrees of attempted murder.'
C. Justice Kennard's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennard focused her dissenting opinion on the language of the
1986 amendment.' She contended that the addition of the provision im-
posing a life sentence for attempted murder that is "willful, deliberate,
and premeditated" created a separate crime, not merely a penalty provi-
sion.' Justice Kennard maintained that every Penal Code crime can
include an attempted offense.' Furthermore, she contended that be-
Carbonie, 48 Cal. App. 3d 679, 121 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1975) (holding that defendant
waived her objection when she failed at trial to object to adequacy of notice). See
generally Gabriel J. Chin, Double Jeopardy Violations as "Plain Error" Under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), 21 PEPp. L REv. 1161 (1994) (discussing waiver and
plain error in double jeopardy cases).
21. Bright, 12 Cal 4th at 672, 909 P.2d at 1366, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 744 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
22. Id. at 672, 909 P.2d at 1367, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
23. IdA; see also CAL PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1996) (authorizing degrees of mur-
der).
24. Bright, 12 Cal. 4th at 672, 909 P.2d at 1367, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
25. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting); see also supra note 2 (restating CAL PENAL CODE
§ 664(a) with emphasis on amended portion).
26. Bright, 12 Cal. 4th at 674-83, P.2d at 1368-74, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 746-52 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 683-84, 909 P.2d at 1374, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 752 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 684, 909 P.2d at 1374, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 752 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 687, 909 P.2d at 1376, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see
also CAL PENAL CODE § 21(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996) (setting out the elements of
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cause the defendant was already charged with attempt to commit second
degree murder, double jeopardy prohibits him from being retried for an
attempt to commit first degree murder.'
Ill. IMPACT
This decision does little to change the existing law because prior to
Bright, most courts had already found that attempted murder was not
divided into degrees. 1 One issue raised by this decision, however, is the
defendant's right to a jury trial.' While defendants have a right to a jury
trial on all elements of charged offenses,' defendants are not entitled to
a jury trial for an enhancement or penalty provision.' Yet the majority
opinion failed to specifically address whether the defendant would have
a right to a juty in determining whether premeditation and deliberation
played a part in the attempted murder.'
Also, it is possible that McMiUian v. Pensylvania could be used to
limit the application of Bright.' In McMiUian, the United States Su-
preme Court noted that when the new punishment to the defendant is
substantially greater, states cannot always redefine crimes when the
change will remove the issue of sentence enhancements from the jury.'
attempted murder).
30. Bright, 12 Cal 4th at 687, 909 P.2d at 1377, 49 Cal Rptr. 2d at 755 (Kennard,
J., dissenting).
31. See People v. Miller, 6 CaL App. 4th 873, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193 (1992); People v.
Macias, 137 CaL App. 3d 465, 187 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1982); People v. Douglas, 220 Cal.
App. 3d 544, 269 CaL Rptr. 579 (1990).
32. See Bright, 12 Cal. 4th at 690, 909 P.2d at 1379, 49 Cal Rptr. 2d at 757
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
33. United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995) (holding judge had to submit
question of materiality of defendants false statements to the jury).
34. Id. at 690-91, 909 P.2d at 1379, 49 Cal Rptr. 2d 756 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see
also McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (holding that there is no right to
a jury for sentencing even when facts are in dispute); People v. Wims, 10 Ca. 4th 293,
895 P.2d 77, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 241 (1995) (noting that penalty provisions are sentenc-
ing).
35. See Bright, 12 CaL 4th at 671, 909 P.2d at 1365-66, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743-44.
36. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
37. See Bright, 12 Cal. 4th at 690.92, 909 P.2d at 1379-80, 49 Cal Rptr. 2d at 757-58.
38. McMillian, 477 U.S. at 88.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The defendant in this case was tried and found guilty of attempted
murder, but the jury was unable to convict the defendant on the en-
hancement provision provided by the 1986 amendment to Penal Code
section 664(a).' The supreme court therefore held that the 1986 amend-
ment creates only a penalty provision and not degrees of attempted mur-
der, therefore, double jeopardy is not offended, and the defendant can be
tried again on the issue of premeditation and deliberation.'
KELLY C. QUINN
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39. Bright, 12 Ca] 4th at 658, 909 P.2d at 1357, 49 CaL Rptr. 2d at 735.
40. Id. at 671, 909 P.2d at 1366, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 744.
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V. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
A parent seeking relocation does not bear a burden of
establishing that the move is '1necessary" as a condition
of custody: In re Marriage of Burgess.
I. INTRODUCTION
In In re Marriage of Burgess,' the court considered "whether a parent
seeking to relocate after dissolution of marriage is required to establish
that the move is 'necessary' before he or she can be awarded physical
custody of minor children."2 The trial court entered judgment for the
moving parent, allowing the mother to move to Lancaster with the chil-
dren The court of appeal reversed, finding that the move to Lancaster
was not "reasonably necessary"; rather, it was merely for convenience.'
1. 13 Cal. 4th 25, 913 P.2d 473, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 444 (1996). Justice Mask wrote
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard, George,
Werdegar, and Chin concurred Id. at 28-40, 913 P.2d at 476-84, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
447-55. Justice Baxter wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion. Id, at 40-44, 913 P.2d
at 484-86, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455-57 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
2. Id. at 28, 913 P.2d at 476, 51 Cal Rptr. 2d at 447. In May of 1992, Paul (father)
and Mary (mother) Burgess separated when their two children were three and four
years old. Id. at 29, 913 P.2d at 476, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447. Shortly thereafter, the
mother sought marital dissolution. Id, "In July 1992, the trial court entered a 'Stipula-
tion and Order' dissolving the marriage and providing for temporary custody in accor-
dance with a mediation agreement between the parties" Id The parents agreed to
share joint legal custody of the children while the mother assumed sole physical cus-
tody I& The mother later accepted employment in Lancaster and announced her inten-
tion to relocate herself and the children at a custody hearing in February 1993. Id. at
29, 913 P.2d at 477, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448. In response, the father testified that he
would not be able to keep his current visitation schedule because of the forty minute
distance between Tehachapi and Lancaster. Id. at 30, 913 P.2d at 477, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 448. Thus, he requested that he be made the children's primary caretaker should the
mother relocate to Lancaster. Id
3. Id,
4. Id. at 31, 913 P.2d at 477-78, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448-49. The court of appeal for-
mulated a three part test for relocation cases. Id First, the "noncustodial non-moving"
parent must demonstrate that the move "will impact significantly the existing pattern of
care and adversely affect the nature and quality of the noncustodial parent's contact
with the child." Id, (quoting In re Marriage of Burgess, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 230
(1995)). If this burden is met, then the other parent has the burden of proving that the
relocation is reasonably necessary. Id. at 31, 913 P.2d at 478, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449.
Last, if necessity is shown, then "the trial court 'must resolve whether the benefit to
the child in going with the moving parent outweights the loss or diminution of contact
with the nonmoving parent.'" Id. at 31, 913 P.2d at 478, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449
1113
The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal, holding that
a parent "has the right to change the residence of a child, subject to the
power of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the rights
or welfare of the child."'
U1. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Mosk, writing for the majority, first addressed the issue of the
trial court's role in an initial custody determination.' Citing Family Code
Section 3040(b), he stated that the trial court has wide discretion in
choosing "a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child."7 Ad-
dressing the issue of relocation by one or both parents, the court held
that either parent has the right to move, so long as the move is in the
"best interest" of the child.8 Additionally, the court limited the court of
appeal's review, allowing reversal only when a trial court has abused its
discretion.' Specifically, the court of appeal may only address "whether
the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the order in ques-
tion advanced the 'best interests' of the child."'0
The court next discussed the issue of showing that the relocation is a
"necessity" in order to retain custody." The court held that in an initial
(quoting In re Marriage of Burgess, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 231 (1995)).
5. Id. at 29, 913 P.2d at 476, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447 (quoting CAL FAM. CODE
§ 7501 (West 1994)). For an opinion addressing federal post-divorce laws, see Mandy S.
Cohen, Note, A Toss of the Dice... The Gamble with Post-Divorce Relocation Laws,
18 HoIFTRmA L REv. 127 (1989) (discussing the need for uniform rules among states
regarding child custody, due to the increased mobility in modem society).
6. Burgess, 13 Cal. 4th at 31-33, 913 P.2d at 478-79, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449-50.
7. Id. at 31, 913 P.2d at 478, 51 CaL Rptr. 2d at 449 (citing CAL FANL CODE
§ 3040(b) (West 1994)). See generally 33 CAL JuR. 3D Family .Law § 903 (1994) (dis-
cussing the discretion of the court in making a custody award); 10 B.E. WIrmN, SUM-
MARY OF CALiFORNiA LAW, Parent and Child § 139 (9th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1996) (dis-
cussing the discretionary power of the trial court). But see Janet Bulow & Steven G.
Gellman, Note, The Judicial Role in Post-Divorce Child Relocation Controversies, 35
STAN. L REv. 949 (1983) (criticizing the courts' discretionary powers in relocation cases
and its use of the "best interests" standard to resolve disputes).
8. Burgess, 13 Cal. 4th at 31-32, 913 P.2d at 478, 51 CaL- Rptr. 2d at 449. The court
citing Family Code Section 7501, stated that "[a] parent entitled to custody of a child
has a right to change the residence of the child, subject to the power of the court to
restrain a removal that would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child." Id at 32,
913 P.2d at 478, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449 (citing CAL FAM. CODE § 7501 (West 1994)).
9. Id. at 32, 913 P.2d at 478, 51 CaL Rptr. 2d at 449.
10. Id The court further stated that the reviewing court must "uphold the ruling if
it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether such basis was actually invoked." Id
at 32, 913 P.2d at 478, 51 CaL Rptr. 2d at 449.
11. Id. at 33-36, 913 P.2d at 479-81, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 450-52.
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custody determination, there is no statutory basis for requiring "either
parent to justify a choice of residence as a condition of custody." 2 Criti-
cizing the court of appeal, the court stated that "'necessity' of relocating
frequently has little, if any, substantive bearing on a parent's suitability to
retain the role of a custodial parent" 3 Thus, the court declined to im-
pose on the relocating parent the burden of establishing necessity.4
Lastly, the court addressed the issue of altering legal and physical
custody. 5 The court held that the noncustodial parent must show a sub-
stantial change of circumstances "so affecting the minor child that modi-
fication is essential [or expedient or imperative] to the child's welfare.""
Moreover, where the custodial parent's relocation is at issue, the burden
of persuasion remains with the noncustodial parent to show that the
change in custody is in the child's best interest. 7 The court placed the
12. Id. at 34, 913 P.2d at 479, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 450. The court listed several fac-
tors that a trial court must use in an initial custody determination, among them are,
"the effects of relocation on the 'best -interest' of the minor children, including the
health, safety, and welfare of the children and the nature and amount of contact with
both parents." Id. (citing CAL FAM. CODE § 3011(a) & (c) (West 1994)). See generally
Carolyn Eaton Taylor, Note, Making Parents Behave: The Conditioning of Child Sup-
port and Visitation Rights, 84 COLUM. L REV. 1059 (1984) (challenging the current
judicial approaches to post-divorce disputes and discussing the interests of each party
to the dispute); Frank G. Adams, Comment, Child Custody and Parental Relocations:
Loving Your Children Prom a Distance, 33 DuQ. L REV. 143 (1994) (discussing the
difficulties of continued contact by both parents with the child where the custodial
parent relocates).
13. Burgess, 13 Cal. 4th at 36, 913 P.2d at 481, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452. The court
does list one exception where the parent's sole reason for moving is to frustrate the
noncustodial parent's contact with the children. Id. at n.6, 913 P.2d at 481 n.6, 51 Cal
Rptr. 2d at 952 r.6. However, the court rejected the court of appeal's interpretation of
Family Code Section 3020 that "frequent and continuous contact" with both parents
establishes the "necessity" requirement for relocation. Id. at 34, 913 P.2d at 480, 51
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 451. Rather, the court found that "It]he Family Code specifically re-
frains from establishing a preference or presumption in favor of any arrangement for
custody and visitation. Id,
14. Id. at 36, 913 P.2d at 481, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 452.
15. Id. at 37, 913 P.2d at 481, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452.
16. Id. The court stated that a change in custody is not justified merely because the
custodial parent makes a good faith decision to relocate; rather, relocation must be so
detrimental to the child that modification is "essential or expedient for the welfare of
the child." Id. at 38, 913 P.2d at 482, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453; see also 10 B.E. WnX,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Parent and Child § 138 (9th ed. 1989) (discussing the
power to modify a custody award based on changed circumstances); 33 CAL. JuR. 3D
Family Law § 938 (Supp. 1996) (explaining the "expedient, essential, and imperative"
rule).
17. Burgess, 13 Cal. 4th at 37, 913 P.2d at 482, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453 (quoting In
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burden on the "requesting" parent to promote its policy of maintaining
custody with the primary caretaker, thereby allowing the child a more
stable custodial and emotional environment.18
B. Justice Baxter's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
In a separate opinion, Justice Baxter concurred with the majority's
result and several parts of its reasoning. 9 Justice Baxter agreed with
the majority that custody decisions should be in the best interest of the
child, in light of all relevant factors, irrespective of whether a parent is
moving.' Additionally, he stated that no special burden should rest on
the moving parent to prove the "necessity" of the move.2' Lastly, he
agreed that where an initial award of custody is made, and one parent
wants to alter the custody arrangement, the changed circumstances rule
should apply.
2
Although he concurred with the majority on several points, Justice
Baxter dissented with regard to the court's implication that "the child's
'best interest' has a special, more stringent connotation in a 'changed
circumstances' case."2' He was concerned about the majority's focus on
In re Marriage of Carney? which stated that a change in custody can-
not occur absent a change in circumstances which "render it essential or
expedient for the welfare of the child that there be change."' Justice
re Marriage of Garay, 24 Cal. 3d at 725, 730, 598 P.2d 36, 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385).
The court stated that the "change of circumstances" rule did not apply to the instant
case because it involved an initial custody determination rather than a change in custo-
dy determination. Burgess, 13 CaL 4th at 37 n.8, 913 P.2d at 481 n.8, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 452 n.8. However, the court recognized the necessity to fashion a rule because the
two instances are closely interrelated. Id,
18. Id. at 37, 913 P.2d at 481, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452.
19. Id. at 40, 913 P.2d at 484, 51 Cal. Rplr. 2d at 455 (Baxter, J., concurring and
dissenting).
20. Id. (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
21. Id. (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
22. Id. at 41, 913 P.2d at 484, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455 (Baxter, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Baxter stated, "[a] child's welfare is not served by casual changes
in caregiving arrangements, and the law abhors the endless relitigation of matters al-
ready determined." Id. (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Burchard v. Garay,
42 Cal. 3d 531, 536, 724 P.2d 486, 489, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800, 803 (1986)).
23. Id. at 41, 913 P.2d at 484, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455 (Baxter, J., concurring and
dissenting).
24. In re Marriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 598 P.2d 36, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1979),
overruled in part by Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 724 P.2d 486, 229 Cal. Rptr.
800 (1986), and ovemed in part by In re Marriage of Burgess, 32 Cal. App. 4th 1786,
39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213 (5th Dist 1995).
25. Burgess, 13 Cal. 4th at 41, 913 P.2d at 484-85, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455-56
(Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting In re Marriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d
725, 598 P.2d 36, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1979)). Specifically, Justice Baxter was concerned
1116
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Baxter raised concern over the majority's holding, under the Carney
decision, that a custodial parent has a "presumptive right" to change resi-
dence.' He interpreted the right to mean that, according to the majori-
ty, a moving parent could retain custody even if the move was not in the
"best interests" of the child so long as the move causes no "positive
harm.""7
El. IMPACT
While holding that a parent need not show "necessity" to relocate, the
court recognized that creating any bright line rules would be inappro-
priate.' Rather, the courts must conduct evaluations on a case-by-case
basis.' On the other hand, through the court's preference for custodial
stability and its creation of a custodial parent's "presumptive right" to
relocate, the court has made it more difficult for the noncustodial parent
to challenge a relocation.' Under such a presumption, the court's hold-
ing creates the possibility that a parent may retain custody of the child
even where a move may not be in the "best interests" of the child."1 Fur-
with the majority's use of a statute created in 1872, now Family Code Section 7501.
Burgess, 13 CaL 4th at 41, 913 P.2d at 485, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 456 (Baxter, J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501 (West 1988)). He argued that Sec-
tion 7501 does not deal with custody disputes, rather, it deals only with "rights be-
tween parents and their children." Burgess, 13 Cal. 4th at 42, 913 P.2d at 485, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 456 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
26. Id. at 41, 913 P.2d at 485, 51 CaL Rptr. 2d at 456 (Baxter, J., concurring and
dissenting).
27. Id. at 42-43, 913 P.2d at 485, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 456 (Baxter, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Baxter's interpretation of Carney differed from the majority. He did
not believe that the case required showings of positive detriment in "changed circum-
stances" cases. Id. at 43, 913 P.2d at 486, 51 CaL Rptr. 2d at 457 (Baxter, J., concur-
ring and dissenting). Rather, under Justice Baxter's view, the prior "best interest" find-
ings in the initial custody determination could not be relitigated in a subsequent hear-
ing. Id. at 43, 913 P.2d at 486, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 457 (Baxter, J., concurring and dis-
senting).
28. Id. at 39, 913 P.2d at 483, 51 CaL Rptr. 2d at 454. But see Kimberly K Holtz,
Comment, Move-away Custody Disputes: The Implications of Case-by-Case Analysis
and the Need for Legislation, 35 SANTA CLARA L REV. 319 (1995) (criticizing the lack
of guidelines and objective standards for judges to use in "move-away" cases).
29. Burgess, 13 Cal. 4th at 39, 913 P.2d at 483, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454. While stat-
ing that in most cases the primary caretaker will prevail, the court reasoned that other
factors must still be considered, such as "the child's existing contact with both par-
ents... and the child's age, community ties, and health and educational needs." Id.
30. Id. at 32, 913 P.2d at 478, 51 CaL Rptr. 2d at 449.
31. Id. at 42-43, 913 P.2d at 485, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 456 (Baxter, J., concurring and
1117
thermore, by requiring the noncustodial parent to show substantial
prejudice, the court may be creating a "bright line barrier" that a noncus-
todial parent must overcome to prevent a particular relocation.'
IV. CONCLUSION
Today, in an increasingly mobile society, tensions continue to arise
where one divorced parent proposes to move the children away from the
other divorced parent. Following the opinion in Burgess, which states
that a parent must show a substantial change in circumstances to modify
a custodial arrangement, it still remains unclear whether the court has
slowed down a parent's mobility. Moreover, as Justice Baxter points out,
what is more uncertain is whether the "best interests" of the child re-
main the most important factor in a relocation determination.
JEREMY D. DOLNICK
dissenting).
32. Id. at 38, 913 P.2d at 482, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453.
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VI. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A plaintiff may state a cause of action for fraudulent in-
ducement of an employment contract because: (1) fraud
actions are permitted in the employment context, and
(2) damages for employment termination are not limited
to contract remedies: Lazar v. Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Lazar v. Superior Court,1 the California Supreme Court considered
whether a plaintiff could plead fraudulent inducement of an employment
contract, and if so, under what circumstances such a cause of action
could be maintained!2 At the trial level, the plaintiffs causes of action
were limited to violations of Labor Code section 970' and breach of con-
1. 12 Cal. 4th 631, 909 P.2d 981, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377 (1996). Justice Werdegar
wrote the nuority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Arabian, Baxter,
and George concurred. Id. at 634-49, 909 P.2d at 982-92, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378-88.
Justice Mosk wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 649-51, 909 P.2d at 992-93, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 388-89 (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Kennard also authored a concurring
opinion. Id. at 661, 909 P.2d at 993, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 389 (Kennard, J., concurring).
2. Id. at 634-35, 909 P.2d at 982-83, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378-79. At trial, the plaintiff
alleged that for 18 years he was employed by a family-owned restaurant in New York,
and as of 1990 he was earning $120,000 annually as president Id. at 635, 909 P.2d at
983, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379. The plaintiff further explained that in late 1989 and early
1990 he was recruited by the defendant, Rykoff-Sexton, Inc. (Rykoff), to work in its
West Coast offices. I& The plaintiff alleged that Rykoff made representations to him
that the company was financially strong, that there was a real chance for advance-
ment, that raises would quickly be forthcoming, that no written employment contract
was necessary, and that he would not be terminated as long as he performed his du-
ties and accomplished goals. Id. at 635-36, 909 P.2d at 983, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379.
The plaintiff accepted the employment offer and moved his family to Southern Cali-
fornia. Id, at 636, 909 P.2d at 984, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380. The plaintiff alleged that
Rykoffs representations were false, and Rykoffs agents knew them to be false in that
they knew Rykoff was financially unstable, they knew Rykoff planned a merger which
would eliminate the plaintiffs position, and they knew company policy prevented grant-
ing the promised annual wage increases. Id. at 636, 909 P.2d at 983-84, 49 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 379-80. Finally, the plaintiff alleged that two years after he joined Rykoff, the
plaintiffs position was usurped by a new management structure and promises to pre-
serve plaintiffs image as a competent employee were broken. Id, at 636-37, 909 P.2d at
984, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380.
3. Labor Code § 970 states in pertinent part:
No person . .. directly or indirectly, shall influence, persuade, or engage any
person to change from one place to another in this State or from any place
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tract.4 The court of appeal ruled that the plaintiff had alleged facts suffi-
cient to state a cause of action for fraudulent inducement of an employ-
ment contract.5 Examining only the court of appeal's conclusion that the
plaintiff had set forth a proper claim for fraudulent inducement of an
employment contract, the supreme court affirmed the appellate deci-
sion.'
U1. TREATMENT
A. Justice Werdegar's Majority Opinion
1. Promissory Fraud
Justice Werdegar examined the elements of fraud,7 noting that within
the cause of action for fraud lie actions for promissory fraud.' Actions
for promissory fraud may arise when false promises are made to induce
contract formation. An enforceable contract need not have been fully
formed for a promissory fraud claim to arise, but if a plaintiff brings
both a fraud and a breach of contract cause of action,"0 the rule prohib-
iting double recovery precludes recovery of both the tort and contract
outside to any place within the State .. . for the purpose of working in any
branch of labor, through or by means of knowingly false representations,
whether spoken, written, or advertised in printed form, concerning either (a)
The kind, character, or existence of such work; (b) The length of time such
work will last, or the compensation therefor....
CAL LAB. CODE § 970 (Deering 1991 & Supp. 1996); see also 41 CAL JuE. 3D Labor
§ 19 (Supp. 1996) (stating § 970 was originally enacted to protect migrant workers, but
has not been limited to any category of employment).
4. Lazar, 12 Cal. 4th at 637, 909 P.2d at 984, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380.
5. Id. at 635, 907 P.2d at 982-83, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378-79.
6. Id, at 635, 649, 909 P.2d at 983, 992, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379, 388.
7. -The elements of fraud... are: (a) misrepresentation ... (b) knowledge of
falsity .. . (c) intent to defraud ... (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage."
Id. at 638, 909 P.2d at 984, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380 (quoting 5 B.E. WrriaN, SUMMARY
OF CALFOmRNI LAw, Torts § 676 (9th ed. 1988)).
8. Id. at 638, 909 P.2d at 984-85, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380-81. See generaly 34 CAL
Jum. 3D Praud and Deceit § 20 (1977 & Supp. 1996) (explaining that failures to keep
promises are normally actionable only as breach of contract, but constructive fraud
may also be a remedy under some conditions).
9. Lazar, 12 Cal. 4th at 638, 909 P.2d at 985, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381.
10. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Decisions, Decisions: Some Binding, Some Not, 28
SuFFoLK U. L REV. 17, 26-27 (1994) (preferring contract rules to tort rules except for
cases in which "one's conduct worsens another's situation by increasing the other's
dependence, but in which there is no reliance of the sort required under section 90 [of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts]").
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damages." The court concluded that Lazar's allegations, if true, suffi-
ciently proved the elements of a promissory fraud cause of action."
2. Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc.
The defendant countered that Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc.3 precluded
the court from finding a cause of action for fraudulent inducement of an
employment contract because Hunter limited tort claims for wrongful
termination to those claimed to be in violation of public policy." The
supreme court renounced this argument for three reasons. 5
First, the court pointed to language in Hunter expressly providing for
the possibility "that a misrepresentation not aimed at effecting termina-
tion of employment, but instead designed to induce the employee to alter
detrimentally his or her position in some other respect, might form a
11. Lazar, 12 Cal. 4th at 638, 909 P.2d at 985, 49 Cal Rptr. 2d at 381. See generally
6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1322 (9th ed. 1988) (stating that
the idea behind compensatory damages is to ensure the same wrong will not create
multiple sources of recovery). The court concluded that the plaintiffs fraud claim cov-
ered expenses resulting from relocation, including his loss of income and security.
Lazar, 12 Cal. 4th at 648-49, 909 P.2d at 992, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 388. The contract
claim covered expenses caused by the wrongful termination. Id. For a discussion of
the development of damages for fraud and deceit, see generally 6 B.E. WrrmIN, SUMMA-
RY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1441 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996). For a discussion of
remedies for breach of contract, see generally 1 B.E. WrmN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, Contracts § 797 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1996).
12. Lazar, 12 Cal. 4th at 639, 909 P.2d at 985, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381.
13. Hunter v. Up-right, Inc., 6 Cal. 4th 1174, 864 P.2d 88, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8 (1993).
14. Lazar, 12 Cal. 4th at 639, 909 P.2d at 985, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381. After alleged-
ly being told his employment was soon to be terminated, the plaintiff in Hunter re-
signed. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1179, 864 P.2d at 89, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10. The employ-
er could have fired the plaintiff directly, thereby subjecting himself to contract liability
only, but the misrepresentation opened the door to tort remedies for fraud as well. Id
at 1178-79, 864 P.2d at 89, 26 Cal Rptr. 2d at 10. However, because the fraud was not
necessary to effect the plaintiffs termination, the court concluded the plaintiff had not
detrimentally relied on the misrepresentation. Id at 1178, 864 P.2d at 89, 26 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 9. Under this reasoning, tort causes of action for fraud will fail for lack of reli-
ance in most wrongful termination cases. Id. But see J. Ghent, Annotation, Employer's
Misrepresentations as to Employee's or Agent's Future Earnings as-Actionable Pnzud,
16 A.LR 3D 1311 (1967) ("Some courts take the view that actionable fraud may be
perpetrated by an employer in misrepresenting his employee's or agent's future earn-
ings."). See generally Laura Quackenbush, Wokers' Compensation Exclusivity and
Wrongfld Termination Tort Damages: An Iturious Tug of War?, 39 HASTINGS LJ.
1229, 1238-42 (1988) (discussing tort causes of action for wrongful termination).
15. Lazar, 12 Cal 4th at 640-43, 909 P.2d at 986-88, 49 Cal Rptr. 2d at 382-84.
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basis for a valid fraud claim even in the context of a wrongful termina-
tion."18 The court found that because the plaintiffs employer made mis-
representations to induce him into employment, rather than to compel
his resignation, Hunter did not preclude his claim.17
Second, the supreme court found clear reference in Hunter to the
availability of actions for promissory fraud, even when a breach of con-
tract action is also brought, because not all employer conduct falls with-
in the contractual employment relationship. 8 Thus, when conduct falls
outside contractual obligations, a "defrauded employee is entitled to
recover tort damages." 9
Finally, the supreme court explained that the reasoning behind Hunter
did not apply to the plaintiffs situation.' The fraud claim in Hunter
was disallowed because the fraud element of detrimental reliance was
necessarily missing for an employee who knew he could be fired out-
right.2' The court concluded that even if an employee did rely on a mis-
representation which resulted in his termination, such reliance would not
cause the employee any detriment because he could also have been sim-
ply fired.' The court emphasized that its holding in Hunter was not
meant to jeopardize established uses of fraud causes of action by termi-
nated employees.'
3. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.
As a policy argument, the defendant contended that Foley v. Interac-
tive Data Corp.2' should apply to fraudulent inducement of employment
16. Id. at 640, 909 P.2d at 986, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382 (quoting Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th
at 1185 n.1, 864 P.2d at 94 n.1, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14 n.1).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 640-41, 909 P.2d at 986-87, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382-83; see Hunter, 6 CaL.
4th at 1186 n.1, 864 P.2d at 94 n.1, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14 n.1 ("[Niothing in this opin-
ion affects the availability of tort damages in any case... of promissory frauc"); id,
at 1188, 864 P.2d at 96, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16 (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("[In cases of
promissory fraud... both the breach [of contract] and the fraud leading to the
breach are separately actionable."); id. at 1197, 864 P.2d at 102, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23
(Kennard, J., dissenting) (stating that a defrauded employee may recover tort damages
for the employer's conduct that is outside the scope of the employment relationship).
19. Lazar, 12 Cal. 4th at 641, 909 P.2d at 987, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383 (quoting
Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1197, 864 P.2d at 102, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting)).
20. Id. at 641, 909 P.2d at 987, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383.
21. Id. at 641-42, 909 P.2d at 987, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383.
22. Id. at 642, 909 P.2d at 987-88, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383-84. Causation and actual
reliance are treated in 5 B.E. WrauN, SUMMARY OF CALIORNIA LAW, Torts § 711 (9th
ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996).
23. Lazar, 12 Cal. 4th at 642, 909 P.2d at 987-88, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383-84.
24. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
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contract cases.a Foley indicated that employment termination damages
should be limited to contract remedies.' The supreme court distin-
guished Foley on several grounds and found it inapplicable.
7
a. The logic of Foley is inapplicable
The first key distinction the court made was that Foley involved a
contract cause of action in which the court refused "to expand the avail-
ability of tort remedies for breach of contract," whereas Lazar involved a
tort cause of action in which the plaintiff sought established tort reme-
dies.' The court in Foley was urged to sanction the granting of tort
remedies for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in an employment contract' 9 The court declined, believing such
a holding would infringe upon the legislature's role in creating new
torts.' The court in Lazar noted for contrast the long history of actions
for promissory fraud."
Second, the court found that the policy concern in Foley, of preventing
widespread tort recovery in termination suits applied to a lesser extent
in the present case.' The court emphasized that unlike a new contract
cause of action with tort remedies, tort recovery for fraud is already
limited because it must be pled specifically.' The court thus concluded
that the economic concerns related to holding employers liable in tort
are not pervasive enough to exempt "employers from ordinary fraud
rules that apply to Californians generally."'
25. Lazar, 12 CaL 4th at 643-44, 909 P.2d at 988, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384.
26. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 696, 765 P.2d at 398, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37.
27. Lazar, 12 Cal. 4th at 643-48, 909 P.2d at 988-92, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384-88.
28. Id. at 647, 909 P.2d at 991, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 387.
29. Foley, 47 CaL 3d at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
30. Lazar, 47 Cal 3d at 644, 909 P.2d at 989, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384-85. Other
courts have also declined to grant tort remedies for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in the employment context. See W. Wendell Hall & Ren~e
A. Forinash, Employment and Labor Law, 48 SMU L REv. 1135, 1176 (1995). For the
view that breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be ac-
tionable in tort, see H. Anthony Miller & R Wayne Estes, Recent Judicial Limitations
On the Right to Discharge: A Ca/tfornia Trilogy, 16 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 65 (1982).
31. Lazar, 12 Cal. 4th at 644, 909 P.2d at 989, 49 CaL Rptr. 2d at 385.
32. Id. at 644-45, 909 P.2d at 989, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 385.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 644-45, 909 P.2d at 989-90, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 385-86.
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b. Hunter's discussion of Foley's underlying policy considerations
is inapplicable
The defendant further argued that based on policy discussed in Hunt-
er, cases stemnming from the employment relationship are confined to
contractual remedies unless a fundamental public policy has been trans-
gressed. In response, the supreme court reiterated that its view of the
employment relationship as primarily contractual3M meant only that re-
covery for breaches of employment contracts should be limited to con-
tract remedies, not that any legitimate claims for fraud should be endan-
gered because they arise in an employment context.37
The court also discounted the applicability of other cases mentioned in
Hunter which the defendant cited to defend its position that employers
should generally not face tort liability for wrongful termination.' Judge
Werdegar warned that nothing in those cases supported the defendant's
position. Rather, they merely expressed the general understanding of
employment relationships and should not be read to rule out tort liability
for employers who wrongfully terminate employees.'
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
Justice Mosk agreed with the decision and most of the reasoning of
the majority, but added that the Hunter decision is flawed because it
"stands for the radical proposition" that policy concerns may preclude a
finding of any tort liability in the employment termination context.40 He
supported the majority's determination that a fraud cause of action is
sustainable only when an employee detrimentally relies on an employer's
misrepresentation, but cautioned that the element of detrimental reliance
cannot be automatically assumed to be absent whenever an employer
who acts deceptively also had a legal right to fire the employee.4 1 He
presented as an example a situation in which an employer who could fire
35. Id. at 647, 909 P.2d at 991, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 387.
36. See Kate XV Fox, Wyoming Employment Law, 31 LAND & WATER L REV. 775,
776-84 (1996) (examining the roles of express contracts, implied-in-fact contracts, oral
contracts, and promissory estoppel in employment contracts).
37. Lazar, 12 Cal. 4th at 647, 909 P.2d at 991, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 387.
38. Id, at 647-48, 909 P.2d at 991, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 387 (referring to American
Guar. & Liab. v. Vista Med. Supply, 699 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Soules v.
Cadam, Inc., 2 Cal. App. 4th 390, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6 (1991), overruled by Turner v.
Anheuser Busch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 1238, 876 P.2d 1022, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 223 (1994); and
Hine v. Dittrich, 228 Cal. App. 3d 59, 278 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1991)).
39. Id,
40. Id. at 649, 909 P.2d at 992, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 388 (Mosk, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 650, 909 P.2d at 993, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 389 (Mosk, J., concurring).
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an employee outright might instead "resort to fraudulent deception" to
reduce the risk of a lawsuit for wrongful termination.'
C. Justice Kennard's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennard wrote separately to express dissatisfaction with the
majority's endorsement of the rationale in Hunter.' Justice Kennard
dissented in Hunter, but agreed that the present case is factually distin-
guishable."
Ell. IMPACT
Before Lazar was decided, Hunter and Foley made possible the argu-
ment that tort actions for wrongful termination were limited to cases
involving a violation of public policy. Had the court accepted that view,
employers would enjoy large-scale immunity from many tort actions."
Lazar makes clear that employees can plead tort actions arising out of
wrongful termination as long as they can prove each element.' Thus,
fraudulent inducement of an employment contract is a viable tort when
the facts support such a pleading.47 Although it is often difficult for
plaintiffs to establish detrimental reliance when a breach of contract
claim is concurrently brought, there will be instances in which the tort
can be successfully proven.
IV. CONCLUSION
In addition to a breach of contract claim, a wrongfully terminated
plaintiff has a tort claim for fraudulent inducement of the employment
contract. Because fraud can occur during initial employee recruitment
and occur outside the contractual employment relationship, policy con-
42. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
43. I& at 651, 909 P.2d at 993, 49 CaL Rptr. 2d at 389 (Kennard, J., concurring).
44. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 648, 909 P.2d at 992, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 388.
46. Id. at 642, 909 P.2d at 988, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384.
47. Id.
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cerns protecting employers do not outweigh an employee's right to plead
traditional tort causes of action when they arise.
TERRI SCHALLENKAMP
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VII. EVIDENCE
When a defendant's testimony implicates a codefendant
in a joint trial, redaction of that testimony is examined
on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the
codefendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is
violated: People v. Fletcher.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Fletcher,' the California Supreme Court addressed wheth-
er a defendant's out-of-court statement that implicates his codefendant
can be redacted by substituting the codefendant's name with a "symbol"
or "neutral pronoun" without violating the codefendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to confront witnesses against him.2 At trial, the court admit-
ted an out-of-court statement3 made by the defendant which had been
1. 13 CaL 4th 451, 917 P.2d 187, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 672 (1996), modifid, No.
S044323, 1996 WL 410895 (Cal. July 12, 1996). Justice Kennard wrote the majority opin-
ion for the court, in which Chief Justice George and Justices Mosk, Baxter, Werdegar,
Chin, and Lucas concurred. Id, at 471, 917 P.2d at 199, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 584. The
Honorable Malcolm M. Lucas, retired Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court,
was assigned specially in accordance with the California Constitution. See CAL. CONST.
art. VI, § 6.
2. Id, at 464-65, 917 P.2d at 194, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579. On June 20, 1991, at
approximately 2:40 an, Maria Fstrada was driving along the freeway with five passen-
gers when she encountered two men standing near a taxi that was stopped on the
freeway on-ramp. Id, at 457, 917 P.2d at 189, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574. Estrada stopped
her car to ask if they needed any help. Id, One of the two men standing near the car
asked Estrada if she had jumper cables, and when she replied that she did not, he
became agitated. I& As Estrada began to drive away, the man she had spoken with
fired a gun at her from close range, fatally wounding her. Id, The two men immediate-
ly ran from the scene. Id. Shortly after the shooting, two men, Moord and Fletcher,
showed up at a friend's doorstep requesting to stay the night. Id at 457-58, 917 P.2d
at 189-90, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574-75. Their friend's mother answered the door, and
instead of allowing them to stay the night, she called a taxi for them. Id, As the two
men waited for the taxi, the mother saw a gun fall from Fletcher's jacket, which he
picked up and put in his jacket. Id. at 458, 917 P.2d at 190, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575.
After the taxi arrived, the two men left and went to the apartment of Fletcher's ex-
girlfriend, where they spent the night Id Fletcher told his ex-girlfriend that "something
had happened and that he hoped no one was dead." Id. Fletcher was later arrested
and, while in custody, made incriminating statements to a fellow inmate, identifying
himself and Moord as the two men who shot Estrada. Id, Moord and Fletcher were
jointly tried for the murder and attempted robbery of Estrada. Id. at 457, 917 P.2d at
189, 53 Cal Rptr. 2d at 574.
3. Id, at 459, 917 P.2d at 190-91, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575-76. Fletcher's fellow in-
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redacted by substituting the codefendant's name with a "neutral pro-
noun."4 The jury was instructed to consider the out-of-court testimony
only against the defendant who made the statement.' Subsequently, both
defendants were found guilty of murder and armed robbery.6 The Cali-
fonda Court of Appeal reversed the conviction of the codefendant on
the ground that the out-of-court testimony was incriminating and violated
his Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause.8 The Call-
mate testified at the first trial about his conversation with Fletcher. "they were using a
ruse of needing a jump . .. to get people to stop" and Fletcher shot a woman who
pulled over to help them. Id. at 459, 917 P.2d at 190, 53 Cal Rptr. 2d at 575. In the
second trial, the witness testified again, stating
'[Fletcher] told me that he and a friend were on a freeway ramp and had a
cab or a vehicle-like there was a cab or something there, and they were
using jumper cables or some kind of ruse to get people to stop and that
they were doing that so when people would stop that they could rob them,
take their money.'... '[Tlhis woman had slowed down and stopped,
and . .. as she drove away he shot at her.'
Id. at 458, 917 P.2d at 190, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575 (first brackets in original).
4. Id. at 459, 917 P.2d at 190, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575. The trial court admitted
Fletcher's statement to the inmate but edited the statement by replacing all references
to Moord with a pronoun or with the phrase "another person." Id
5. Id. In her majority opinion, Justice Kennard reasoned that jury instructions may
be ineffective because it could be "psychologically impossible for jurors to put the
confession out of their minds" to determine the guilt or innocence of the co-defendant.
Id, at 455, 917 P.2d at 188, 53 CaL Rptr. 2d at 573. See generally 1 B.E. WrrKiN, CAI-
IFORNIA EVIDENCE, Circumstantial Evidence § 316 (3d ed. 1995 & Supp. 1995) (discuss-
ing the deletion of inadmissible matter as an alternative to a jury instruction); Sheldon
R Shapiro, Annotation, Necessity of, and Preudical Fffect of Omitting, Cautionary
Instruction to Jury as to Accomplice's Testimony Against Defendant in Federal Crim-
inal T7-a, 17 A.LR FED. 249 (1973) (discussing the ineffectiveness of jury instructions
after incriminating evidence has been introduced).
6. Fletcher, 13 CaL 4th at 459, 917 P.2d at 191, 53 CaL Rptr. 2d at 576.
7. Id. The court of appeal also reversed Fletcher's murder and armed robbery con-
victions on different grounds. Id. at 460 n.2, 917 P.2d at 191 n.2, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
576 n.2. The court affirmed his convictions for offenses unrelated to the issue at hand.
Id. at 457, 917 P.2d at 189, 53 CaL Rptr. 2d at 574.
8. Id, at 459-60, 917 P.2d at 191, 53 CaL Rptr. 2d at 576. The Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment guarantees that a criminal defendant will have the right "to
be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VL The right to
confrontation includes the right to cross-examine witnesses. See generally Christopher
K Descherer & David L Fogel, Sixth Amendment at 7Tial, 84 GEo. LJ. 1222, 1230
(1996) (discussing the Confrontation Clause and a defendant's right to be present at
any crucial stage in which his presence would contribute to his opportunity for effec-
tive cross-examination); William G. Dickett, Note, Sixth Amendment--Limiting the
Scope of Bruton, 78 CRiM L & CRIMINOLOGY 984 (1988) (discussing how hearsay evi-
dence implicates the Sixth Amendment when the defendant was not present to con-
front the party testifying against him out-of-court); 19 CAL JuL. 3D Criminal Law
§ 2126 (1984 & Supp. 1996) (discussing extrajudicial statements and the right of con-
frontation when an accomplice's testimony implicates a second party).
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fornia Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal, hold-
ing that when a defendant's testimony implicates a codefendant in a joint
trial, testimony which has been redacted by replacing the codefendant's
name with a "symbol" or "neutral pronoun" may violate his Sixth Amend-
ment right of confrontation.9
II. TREATMENT
The court began its analysis by reviewing the issue reserved by the
United States Supreme Court in Richardson v. Marsh:0 whether the
Confrontation Clause is violated when an out-of-court statement impli-
cating a codefendant has been redacted by replacing that codefendant's
name with a "symbol" or "neutral pronoun."" In Richardson, the Court
found that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was
not violated where the confession was redacted to omit any indication
that another person participated in the crime." The Court, however, did
not address whether any reference to a coparticipant would violate the
Confrontation Clause." Since Richardson, a split of authority has devel-
oped among federal and state courts." Some jurisdictions hold that
redaction is "always or almost always sufficient" 5 Other jurisdictions
hold that redaction may or may not be sufficient and should be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis."
9. Fletcher, 13 Cal. 4th at 468-69, 917 P.2d at 197, 53 Cal. Rpt. 2d at 582.
10. 481 U.S. 200 (1987). The United States Supreme Court held that in a joint trial
in which a defendant's out-of-court confession implicates his codefendant, the statement
would be admissible without violating the Confrontation Clause if that statement "is
redacted to eliminate not only the [co]defendant's name, but any reference to his or
her existence." Id. at 211. The Court stated that it would "express no opinion on the
admissibility of a confession in which the defendant's name has been replaced with a
symbol or neutral pronoun." Id. at n.5.
11. Fletcher, 13 CaL 4th at 464-65, 917 P.2d at 194, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579.
12. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 203.
13. Fletcher, 13 CaL 4th at 464, 917 P.2d at 194, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579. See gen-
eralUy 1 B.E. WrrN, CAuFORNIA EVIDENCE, The Hearsay Rule § 612 (3d ed. 1995) (dis-
cussing adequacy for editing out-of-court statements).
14. Fletcher, 13 Cal. 4th at 465, 917 P.2d at 194, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579.
15. Id; see United States v. Strickland, 935 F.2d 822, 826 (7th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184, 1192 (4th Cir. 1990); State v.' Craney, 662 A.2d 899, 903
(Me. 1995).
16. Fletcher, 13 Cal. 4th at 465, 917 P.2d at 194, 53 CaL Rptr. 2d at 579; see United
States v. Hoac, 990 F.2d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Van Hemelryck,
945 F.2d 1493, 1502-03 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Long, 900 F.2d 1270, 1280 (8th
Cir. 1990).
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A. The "Contextual Linkage" Problem
The first concern addressed by the Richardson Court was that certain
testimony would be incriminating to a codefendant only when mentioned
in context with evidence to be presented later at trial. 7 In these situa-
tions, a case-by-case analysis would require consideration of redacted
testimony in conjunction with extrinsic evidence."8
The California Supreme Court agreed that, in light of extrinsic evi-
dence presented at trial, some redacted statements will enable a jury to
identify the accused." The court reasoned that redaction would be ef-
fective "unless the average juror... could not avoid drawing the infer-
ence that the nondeclarant is the person so designated in the confes-
sion."' Because redaction requires a fact-specific determination, the
court held that a case-by-case analysis was necessary to determine
whether testimony was incriminating in light of extrinsic evidence to be
presented at trial.2 Although the Richardson Court stated that the case-
by-case analysis would present problems within the courtroom, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court maintained that such effects would not be "insur-
mountable."'
B. Practical Problems for the Trial Judge
One problem addressed by the Richardson Court was that if a trial
judge was required to consider evidence extrinsic to testimony in order
to make a determination of whether that testimony violates the Confron-
tation Clause, motions to exclude testimony or to sever a joint trial
would become complicated.2' The court reasoned that in order to make
17. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208.
18. Id. at 208-09; see James B. Haddad & Richard G. An, A Potential Revolution
in Bruton Doctrine: Is Bruton Applicable Where Domestic Evidence Rules Prohibit Use
of a Co-defendant's Confession as Evidence Against a Defendant Although the Con-
frontation Clause Would Allow Such Use?, 81 J. CRIM. L & CRImNOLOGY 235, 265-66
(1990) (discussing the difficulties of determining the impact of the Confrontation Clause
in a case-by-case analysis).
19. Fletcher, 13 Cal. 4th at 465-66, 917 P.2d at 195, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580. The
court employed People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 466 P.2d 961, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1970),
to illuminate its point that a "bright-line test" would not be appropriate in all circum-
stances. Fletcher, 12 Cal. 4th at 46566, 917 P.2d at 195, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580. In
Terry, the defendant's name was substituted with the word "deleted" in court testimo-
ny, but his identity was obvious to jurors because the statements mentioned charac-
teristics and distinguishing features of the defendant. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d at 384-86, 466
P.2d at 974-75, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 422-23.
20. Fletcher, 13 Cal. at 467, 917 P.2d at 196, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 466-67, 917 P.2d at 195-96, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580-81.
23. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 209.
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these pre-trial determinations, the trial judge must essentially determine
the outcome of the trial before it begins.'
The California Supreme Court stated that such pre-trial determinations
were not problematic because a trial judge could review preliminary
hearing transcripts, depositions, offers of proof submitted by the parties
before trial, and all other case materials submitted in the pre-trial stage
to determine whether to sever trials or exclude evidence.' Furthermore,
the court emphasized that the pre-trial decisions made by the trial judge
would not be irrevocable because rulings made before trial could be
reconsidered at trial if the evidence presented is materially different.'
C. A Less Efficient Court System
A second problem addressed by the Richardson Court was that if
redaction was not effective in preserving a codefendant's rights under
the Confrontation Clause, the court system would become less effi-
cient' The Court reasoned that the trial judge would have to sever
joint trials and hear evidence separately even though the evidence to be
presented would be virtually identical.' This could waste judicial and
prosecutorial resources, create inconveniences to witnesses, risk addi-
tional trauma to crime victims, and increase the possibility of inconsis-
tent verdicts.2
The California Supreme Court argued that the "contextual linkage"
approach, which examines extrinsic evidence in conjunction with
redacted testimony, would not reduce the utility of redaction and, thus,
would protect an individual's Constitutional rights under the Confronta-
tion Clause.' Furthermore, in cases where effective redaction is not
possible, courts have alternatives to severing a joint trial, thus conserving
the efficiency of the courtroom while protecting rights under the Con-
frontation Clause."
24. Id.
25. Fletcher, 13 Cal. 4th at 468, 917 P.2d at 196, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581.
26. Id.
27. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 210.
28. Id,
29. Id.
30. Fletcher, 13 CaL 4th at 468, 917 P.2d at 196, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581.
31. Id. See Note, Richardson v. Marsh Codefendant Confessions and the Demise of
Confrontation, 101 HARv. L REv. 1876, 1890 (1988) (discussing use of multiple juries in
a joint trial to eliminate any prejudice found within a confession); Annotation, Propri-
ety of Use of Multiple Juries at Joint TraI of Multiple Defendants in Federal
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D. The Case-by-Case Approach Adopted
The California Supreme Court considered the practical problems that a
courtroom might face by adopting a case-by-case approach and conclud-
ed that these problems were not insurmountable.' Furthermore, the
consideration of extrinsic evidence with redacted testimony would pro-
vide an effective means of determining whether a portion of testimony
violates a person's confrontation rights.' Thus, the court held that the
propriety of redacting testimony by replacing a codefendant's name with
a "symbol or "neutral pronoun" must be determined on the facts of each
case, in light of the testimony and evidence to be presented at trial.'
III. IMPACT
Prior to Fletcher, the California Supreme Court established a rule in
People v. Arandan that either a defendant's testimony in a joint trial
must be redacted to eliminate any reference to a codefendant or the
court must separate the trials.N This law protected an individual's con-
stitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause to the fullest extent
possible, but may have had a negative impact on the state's ability to
effectively prosecute codefendants in a joint trial.' In Fletcher, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court created state precedent that balances the
accused's constitutional rights with the state's interests in judicial effi-
ciency and the presentation of relevant evidence in a criminal proceed-
ing.' Under Aranda, if testimony could not be redacted to eliminate all
Criminal Case, 72 A.LR F. 875 (1996) (discussing multiple juries in a joint trial in
the Federal criminal court system); David Cad Minneman, Annotation, Propriety of Use
of Multiple Juries at Joint Trial qf Multiple Defendants in State Criminal Ptrsecu-
tion, 41 A.LR 4th 1189 (1995) (discussing multiple juries in a joint trial in the state
criminal court system).
32. Fetcher, 13 Cal. 4th at 468, 917 P.2d at 197, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 582.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965).
36. Id. at 530-31, 407 P.2d at 272-73, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61; see 21 CAL Jun. 3D
Criminal Law § 3208 (1985) (discussing the admissibility of statements made by
codefendants). The Aranda rule corresponds to federal constitutional law in accordance
with Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), and thus is not abrogated by the
1982 adoption of Proposition 8. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d) (stating that relevant
evidence shall not be excluded from any criminal proceeding).
37. See generally Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's
Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S. CAL L REV. 1019 (1987) (discussing laws that strengthen
individual rights and their impact on the ability of the state to prosecute effectively);
Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Conlfrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35
UCLA L REv. 557, 558-59 n.5 (1988) (discussing various criticisms of laws that favor
the individual or the state).
38. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balanc-
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references to a coparticipant, the evidence would not be admissible in a
joint trial.' The California Supreme Court realized that in certain situa-
tions this law would be unfair to the state and unnecessary to protect
the rights of the accused. The new law immediately benefits the entire
criminal system because the case-by-case analysis should ensure a fair
outcome in criminal proceedings where redaction is at issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
After FRetcher, it is clear that in some cases a defendant's testimony
that implicates his codefendant in a joint trial may be redacted by re-
placing the codefendant's name with a "symbol" or "neutral pronoun"
without violating the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The court
would not establish a precedent which would unfairly favor the prosecu-
tion or the defense, but stated that the determination of whether
redacted testimony is incriminating must be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis. This decision balances the individual's interests with those of the
state, and should provide a fair and efficient analysis in each individual
case.
CHRISTIANE ELYN CARGILL
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ing, 96 YALE LJ. 943 (1987) (discussing the process of balancing conflicting interests
within the judicial system).
39. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353.
VIII. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
A legislative amendment which excludes surety insur-
ance from a voter implemented rate rollback and approv-
al statute is invalid because it does not further the pur-
poses of Proposition 103, the statute under which the
amendment was codified: Amwest Surety Insurance
Co. v. Wilson.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Amwest Surety Insurance Co. v. Wilson,1 the California Supreme
Court determined whether a legislative amendment adding surety insur-
ance to a list of insurances exempt from the recently passed rate reduc-
tion and rate approval initiative was valid in light of the requirement that
any legislative amendments to the initiative must further the objectives of
the initiative.2 The trial court ruled in favor of the insurance company
and held that the amendment was a valid addition to the initiative.' The
three-judge court of appeal rendered judgment for the voter group based
upon article 11, section 10(c) of the state constitution, which states that
"the Legislature may not amend or repeal an initiative statute without
voter approval 'unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal
without their approval."4 Although two of the three court of appeal judg-
es concurred in the judgment, it was unclear from the expressed opinion
whether they agreed with the reasoning of the judgment.' Upon review,
1. 11 Cal. 4th 1243, 906 P.2d 1112, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12 (1996). Justice George de-
livered the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard, Ara-
bian, Baxter, and Werdegar concurred. Id. at 1247-68, 906 P.2d at 1114-28, 48 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 14-28. Justice Mosk authored a concurring opinion. Id, at 1268-69, 906 P.2d at
1128-29, 48 Cal Rptr. 2d at 28-29 (Mosk, J., concurring).
2. Id. at 1251, 906 P.2d at 1116, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17. In 1988, California voters
passed Proposition 103 which required insurance companies to reduce their rates and
obtain approval from the Commissioner of Insurance before implementing any rate in-
creases. Id. at 1247, 906 P.2d at 1114, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14. Additionally, the initiative
provided that "[t]he provisions of this act shall not be amended by the legislature ex-
cept to further its purposes." Id. After the initiative passed, Amwest Surety Insurance
Co. filed suit against the government claiming that Proposition 103 was invalid with re-
spect to surety insurance. Id. at 1249, 906 P.2d at 1115, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15. In
1990, after the courts held that several other sections of Proposition 103 were invalid,
the government amended the act to exclude surety insurance from its reach. Id. at
1249-50, 906 P.2d at 1115-16, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16-17. Shortly thereafter, a voters
group intervened in the suit, claiming that the legislature's amendment was invalid and
did not further the underlying purposes of the initiative. Id. at 1250, 906 P.2d at 1116,
48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16. For a general discussion of legislative alterations of initiatives,
see 38 CAL Jun. 3D Initiative and Referendum § 15 (1994).
3. Amwest, 11 Cal. 4th at 1250, 906 P.2d at 1116, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16.
4. Id. (quoting CAL CONST. art. I, § 10(c)).
5. Id.; see 5 CAL JuE. 3D Appe//ate Review § 559 (1994) (discussing the require-
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the supreme court affirmed the court of appeal in its finding that the
California Legislature's amendment excluding surety insurance from the
auspices of the initiative statute was invalid because it did not further
the law's purposes. Nevertheless, the court also held that the appellate
court's opinion did not meet the state "constitutional requirement that
the reasons for the decision rendered by the appellate court be stated in
writing."7
Il. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The court began its opinion by exploring the applicable standard of
review, namely whether the court should defer to the legislature or con-
strue the initiative's language according to accepted principles of statuto-
ry interpretation.' After noting the scarcity of case precedent addressing
similar language regarding the government's right to amend, the court
decided that deference to the legislature was inappropriate; however, the
court qualified its conclusion by applying "'a strong presumption of
constitutionality'" to the legislature's amendment.9 Thus, the court de-
clared that it would rule in favor of the government if there was any
rational basis to conclude that the amendment served the purposes of
the initiative statute.' °
Not limiting interpretation of the initiative's purposes to those ex-
pressed in the proposition's text, the court detailed the history of insur-
ance regulation, from federal control under the McCarran-Ferguson Act
to state mandates under the McBride-Grunsky Insurance Regulatory Act
ments imposed on reviewing court opinions, as well as exceptions to the rules).
6. Amwest, 11 Cal. 4th at 1265, 906 P.2d at 1126, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 26.
7. Id, at 1267, 906 P.2d at 1127, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27-28; see J. Clark Kelso, A
Report on the Catifornia Appellate System, 45 HhsmGs L. 433, 487-98 (1994) (dis-
cussing the process of opinion publication).
8. Amwest, 11 Cal. 4th at 1251, 906 P.2d at 1116, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17. But see
Stephen H Sutro, Interpretations of Initiatives by Refeence to Similar Statutes: Can-
ons of Construction Do Not Adequately Measure Voter Intent, 34 SANTA CLARA L REV.
945, 973-76 (1994) (arguing that courts should limit their interpretation of initiatives to
the words that were before the peoples' eyes when they voted).
9. Amwest, 11 Cal. 4th at 1252-53, 906 P.2d at 1117-18, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18
(quoting California Hous. Fin. Agency v. Patitucci, 22 Cal. 3d 171, 175, 583 P.2d 729,
731, 148 Cal. Rptr. 875, 877 (1978)).
10. Id at 1256, 906 P.2d at 1120, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20
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of 1947." Addressing the McBride-Grunsky Act, which created state in-
surance regulation in California, the supreme court explained that insur-
ance rates, including surety insurance, were traditionally checked by
market competition. 2 In contrast, the court recognized that the two
major purposes of Proposition 103 were to reduce insurance rates, and
"replace the former system for regulating insurance rates (which relied
primarily upon competition between insurance companies).""3 Accord-
ingly, the court found that the legislature's amendment exempting surety
insurance from the people's statute did not further the purpose of rate
reduction, and because Proposition 103 as enacted replaced the former
regulations, the court held that the amendment was invalid. 4
Turning to the argument of partial exemption of surety insurance from
the "rate rollback" and commissioner approval provisions of the amend-
ment, the supreme court held that the addition to the initiative statute
did not further the purpose to "ensure that rates were fair and reason-
able at the inception of the regulations promulgated in Proposition
103."" The court concluded its analysis of the amendment issue with
the observation that the people intended Proposition 103 to "have broad
application to various types of insurance," a purpose which the legisla-
tive amendment should not limit'6
The court further considered whether the form of the appellate court's
opinion satisfied the state constitutional requirement that supreme court
decisions and court of appeal decisions "be in writing 'with reasons stat-
ed.'" 7 The supreme court held that the appellate court's opinion failed
to meet this requirement because the concurrence in the judgment did
not set forth the reasons for the decision. 8
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
Justice Mosk concurred with the majority, but disagreed with the
amount of deference given to the legislature by the court. Justice Mosk
asserted that it is the court's role to review and interpret state congres-
11. Id. at 1257, 906 P.2d at 1120, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
12. Id, at 1258, 906 P.2d at 1121, 48 Cal Rptr. 2d at 21.
13. ld. at 1259, 906 P.2d at 1122, 48 CaL Rptr. 2d at 22.
14. Id. at 1261, 906 P.2d at 1123, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23.
15. Id at 1262-63, 906 P.2d at 1124, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24-25.
16. Id. at 1264-65, 906 P.2d at 1125-26, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25-26.
17. Id. at 1265, 906 P.2d at 1126, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 26.
18. Id. at 1267, 906 P.2d at 1127, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27-28. The court declared that
concurrence 'in the judgment" and concurrence 'in the result" have essentially the
same meaning. Id. at 1267, 906 P.2d at 1127, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27. The court noted
that neither phrase may be construed as agreeing with the majority's underlying rea-
sons for the final result of the case. Id, (citing B.E. WrrKIN, MANUAL ON APPEuATE
COURT OPINIONS § 115 (1977)).
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sional acts, not to be bound by them. 9 Justice Mosk also took issue
with the majority's holding that the appellate court failed to issue its
opinion in writing with reasons stated.' He interpreted that phrase to
preclude summary dispositions, which was not the problem in the case
at bar.2'
III. IMPACT
Although the court presumed that "the Legislature acted within its
authority," Amwest reinforces the premise that it is extremely difficult, if
not impossible, for the government to change a law enacted by the peo-
ple.? Accordingly, the court has adopted a standard of deferring to the
voters in connection with enacted propositions, rather than the court's
traditional deference to the legislature's judgment.2 Legislative alter-
ations to initiative laws will most likely be confined to minor corrections
of drafting errors, clarifications of statutory language clearly within the
enacted proposition's scope, and adjustments necessary to "facilitate the
initiative's operation in changed circumstances."'
Additionally, with respect to the supreme court's review of the appel-
late court's written opinion, the court considered the meaning of "con-
cur[ring] in the result."' Because the court found that judges who sim-
19. Amuwt, 11 Cal. 4th at 1268-69, 906 P.2d at 1128, 48' Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28-29
(Mosk, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 1269, 906 P.2d at 1128-29, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29 (Mosk, J., concurring).
21. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 1256, 906 P.2d at 1119-20, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20; see also Julian N. Eule,
Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE LJ. 1503, 1545 (1990) (noting that
"state legislatures often are constitutionally limited in the amendment or repeal of voter
action").
23. Amwest, 11 Cal. 4th at 1251-52, 906 P.2d at 1116-18, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16-18;
see also 7 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 121 (9th
ed 1989 & Supp. 1996) ("The constitutional provision for initiative and referendum is
based on 'the theory that all power of government ultimately resides in the
people'.. .") (quoting Associated Home Builders v. Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557
P.2d 473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976)). For discussions of the history, process,
and problems of the California voter initiative, see Rachel A. Van Cleave, A Constitu-
tion in Conflick" The Doctrine of Independent State Grounds and the Voter Initiative
in Catifornia, 21 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 95, 118-21 (1993). See also Elizabeth M. Stein,
The California Constitution and the Counter-Initiative Quagmire, 21 HASTINGS CONST.
LQ. 143 (1993).
24. Amwest, 11 Cal. 4th at 1255-56, 906 P.2d at 1119-20, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19-20.
25. Id, at 1265-66, 906 P.2d at 1126, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 26-27. The court noted that
the phrases "concur in the judgment" and "concur in the result" are synonymous. Id. at
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ply "concur in the result" violate the constitutional provision that all
opinions by the supreme court and courts of appeal be in writing with
reasons stated, judges must now concur in the result, or judgment, as
well as its underlying rationale."
IV. CONCLUSION
In Amwest, the court examined and limited the scope of the
legislature's authority to alter statutes enacted directly by the voting
publicY By limiting the legislature's ability to amend, the court anointed
the people's initiative power with an almost sacred status.'
The court also changed a long-standing practice of allowing appellate
court justices simply to concur in the result Construing the constitution-
al requirement that such opinions be "in writing with reasons stated," the
court mandated that the opinion reflect a concurrence in the judgment
and its underlying justification'
PAMELA SCHLEHER
1267, 906 P.2d at 1127, 48 CaL Rptr. 2d at 27.
26. Id. at 1267, 906 P.2d at 1127, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27-28.
27. Id. at 1265, 906 P.2d at 1126, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 26.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 1267-68, 906 P.2d at 1127-28, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27-28. For further discus-
sion of the Amwest case, see 7 B.E. WrlWN, SUMMARY OF CALFORNIA LAW, Constitu-
tional Law § 121A (Supp. 1996).
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IX. PROPERTY / EMINENT DOMAIN
A fee imposed by the city on an individualized and dis-
cretionary basis as a condition to issuing a development
permit can be a compensable regulatory taking under the
F fth Amendment and is subject to a heightened stan-
dard of judicial scrutiny. Furthermore,, a general ordi-
nance requiring either the placement of art on a develop-
ment site or payment of its equivalent :value is within
the authority of the city, and is not a taking under the
Fifth Amendment: Ehrlich v. City of Culver City.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ehrlich v. City of Culver City,' the California Supreme Court con-
sidered whether a monetary exaction imposed as a condition of approv-
ing a zoning request is a compensable regulatory taking under the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2 The trial court entered judgment
1. 12 Cal. 4th 854, 911 P.2d 429, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242 (1996). Retired Associate
Justice Arabian, assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council, delivered the ma-
jority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justice George concurred. Id. at 859-87,
911 P.2d at 432-51, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245-64. Justice Mosk wrote a concurring opin-
ion. Id, at 887-902, 911 P.2d at 451-61, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 264-74 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring). Justice Kennard concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Justice
Baxter. Id, at 903-12, 911 P.2d at 461-68, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 274-81 (Kennard, J., con-
curring and dissenting). Justice Werdegar concurred in part and dissented in part. Id.
at 912, 911 P.2d at 468, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281 (Werdegar, J., concurring and dissent-
ing).
2. Id. at 859, 911 P.2d at 433, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246. Between 1973 and 1975;
Richard K Ehrlich obtained approval from Culver City to build a private tennis club
and recreational facility on a vacant lot he owned, and he persuaded the city to
amend its zoning laws to allow tennis club activities on the site. Id. at 860-61, 911
P.2d at 433-34, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246-47. After struggling financially with the tennis
club, Ehrlich applied for rezoning of his property in 1981 to permit the development of
a commercial office building in lieu of the health club. Id, at 861, 911 P.2d at 434, 50
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247. The city rejected Ehrlich's application, and the tennis club went
out of business in August 1988. Id. Ehrlich then proposed an alternative rezoning plan
to allow for the construction of a 30-unit condominium complex. Id. Culver City con-
sidered purchasing the property to preserve the recreational facility for public use, but
it lacked the requisite funds. Id. Ehrlich's second rezoning proposal was also rejected.
Id, at 862, 911 P.2d at 434, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247. Upon rejection, discussions re-
sumed in an effort to restructure the condominium project. Id. Culver City initially
suggested that, as a condition for approval, Ehrlich agree to construct four new tennis
courts for public use. Id. However, in lieu of requiring actual construction, the city
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for Culver City and invalidated a $280,000 mitigation fee imposed as a
condition for the project's approval because no reasonable relationship
existed between the proposed project and the need for public recreation-
al facilities.3 The trial court, however, approved a $33,200 art fee, hold-
ing that it was not an unconstitutional taking.'
The court of appeal, on rehearing, reversed the trial court's ruling that
the mitigation fee was an unconstitutional taking, reasoning that a "sub-
stantial nexus" between the condominium project and the $280,000 fee
existed.' On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court ordered
the case remanded to the court of appeal for reexamination in light of its
recent decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard.' Upon remand, the court of
appeal reaffirmed its initial findings in favor of Culver City
The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal, rejecting
the contention that the heightened takings standards of Dolan and
council conditioned its approval upon the payment of a $280,000 mitigation fee to be
used to construct the lost recreational facilities. Id. at 862, 911 P.2d at 434-35, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 247-48. The city derived the $280,000 fee amount from a study of replace-
ment costs for the recreational facilities. I at 862, 911 P.2d at 435, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 248. Additionally, the city conditioned Its approval upon compliance with the "art in
public places" program. Id. The ordinance required all commercial buildings valued in
excess of $500,000 to provide artwork in an amount of one percent of the building's
total value, or pay such amount to the city's art fund. Id, Ehrlich elected to pay the
"in-lieu" fee of $33,200, but his successor in interest later refused to pay the fee, plac-
ing his own chosen artwork in the condominiums. Id, at 862-63, 911 P.2d at 435, 50
CaL Rptr. 2d at 248. Ehrlich, in compliance with the California Government Code, filed
formal written protests regarding both the $280,000 mitigation fee exaction and the
$32,200 "art in public places" fee exaction. I& at 863, 911 P.2d at 435, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 248 These protests were rejected, and Ehrlich filed suit alleging that the imposition
of fees constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Id, To facilitate the completion of his project, Ehrlich paid the $280,000 mitiga-
tion fee in protest, retaining the right to proceed with his lawsuit Id, Culver City ob-
tained a lien on the property as security for payment of the $280,000, pending the
outcome of the suit. Id. For a discussion of what constitutes a taking under the Fifth
Amendment, see John E. Theuman, Annotation, Just Compensation-Taking Property, 89
A.Lk L ED. 2D 977 (1988).
3. Ehziich, 12 CaL 4th at 863, 911 P.2d at 435, 60 Cal Rptr. 2d at 248.
4. Id,
5. Id. at 863-64, 911 P.2d at 435-36, 50 CaL Rptr. 2d at 248-49.
6. Id. at 864, 911 P.2d at 436, 0 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249. The United States Supreme
Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389-91 (1994), set forth the "rough
proportionality" standard to measure the required degree of connection between the
exaction and the impact of the proposed development for possessory dedications.
Dolan expanded the United States Supreme Court's earlier decision of Nolan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987), which adopted the requirement of an
"essential nexus" between the state interest and the permit condition, without which
the possessory dedication would be an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amend-
ment. Ehriich, 12 Cal 4th at 864, 911 R2d at 436, 50 Cal Rptr. 2d at 249.
7. Bhr/ich, 12 Cal. 4th at 864, 911 P.2d at 436, 0 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249.
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Nollan should apply only to possessory dedications of real property.'
The court found that Culver City demonstrated the essential nexus be-
tween the rezoning of Ehrlich's property from recreational to commercial
use and the imposition of a monetary exaction to mitigate the public's
loss of recreational facilities.' The court remanded the case for addition-
al proceedings, finding that Culver City presented insufficient evidence to
sustain the determination of $280,000 as the amount of its mitigation fee
request." Finally, the court upheld the imposition of the $33,200 public
arts fee because it was within Culver City's authority and was not a regu-
latory taking.
11
11. TREATMENT
A. Madority Opinion
1. The statutory framework of the mitigation fee act permits
statutory and constitutional taking challenges.
The court began its analysis by focusing on the required standard for
measuring the validity of exactions under the California Mitigation Fee
Act1 The court stated that a "reasonable relationship" must exist
among (1) the proposed use of the exaction, (2) the type of development
project, and (3) the need for both the public facility and the development
project." The court explained that the statutory reasonable relationship
standard should be construed in light of the constitutional requirements
set forth in Nollan and Dolan because of the statute's conforming legisla-
tive purpose to protect individuals from ad hoc, disproportionate fee
exactions.' The court held that, because the California legislature incor-
porated a standard that reflects the United States Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 5 protests to
8. Id at 859-60, 911 P.2d at 433, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 886, 911 P.2d at 450, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263.
12. Id, at 864-65, 911 P.2d at 436-37, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249-50; see CAL GOVT CODE
§§ 66001, 66021-66022 (West Supp. 1996) (explaining procedures to protest the imposi-
tion of monetary exactions).
13. Ehrtich, 12 Cal. 4th at 865, 911 P.2d at 436-37, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249-50; see
Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606,
94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971) (adopting the "reasonable relationship" test).
14. Ehrich, 12 Cal. 4th at 867, 911 P.2d at 437, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 251.
15. The Takings Clause of the Flfth Amendment states, "private property [shall not]
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development fees under the statute may also embody constitutional chal-
lenges and can be measured by constitutional standards.'6
2. Nonpossessory dedications imposed by a local government on
an individualized and discretionary basis are subject to a
heightened standard of judicial scrutiny.
The court next discussed whether Nollan and Dolan apply to
nonpossesory exactions." The court noted that many courts have inter-
preted the Nolian heightened standard of judicial scrutiny to apply only
to possessory exactions. 8 Nonetheless, the court held that such a
heightened standard must apply to exactions imposed on an individual-
ized and discretionary basis, such as those in the case at bar. 9 The
court reasoned that the risk of excessive use of governmental police
power associated with the physical occupation or conveyance of prop-
erty may also accompany monetary exactions imposed on individual
property owners.' The court illuminated the possibility that governmen-
tal monopoly power over development permits could be exploited
through the imposition of conditions unrelated to legitimate regulatory
objectives.2
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth
Amendment was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in
Chicago B & Q R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897), which held that the
taking of property by the city without compensation violates the Fourteenth Amend-
ment See 8 B.E. WMIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNiA LAw, Constitutional Law § 939 (9th
ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (discussing takings that require just compensation); 29 CAL
Ju. 3D Eminent Domain § 312 (1986 & Supp. 1996) (explaining what constitutes a
taking of property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment).
16. Ehrlich, 12 Cal. 4th at 865-67, 911 P.2d at 436-38, 50 CaL Rptr. 2d at 249-51.
17. Id. at 874-77, 911 P.2d at 447-48, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255.57. See genemlly Jason
R. Biggs, Comment, Nollan and Dolan- The End of Municipal Land Use Extortion-a
California PerWctive, 36 SANTA CLAu L REv. 515, 538-55 (1996) (analyzing Ehrlich
and the general application of the possessory taking holdings of Nollan and Dolan to
non-possessory takings claims in California).
18. Ehrlich, 12 Cal. 4th at 874-77, 911 P.2d at 447-48, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255-57.
19. Id. General or ministerial exactions would not require such a heightened stan-
dard. Id. at 876, 911 P.2d at 444, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257.
20. Id. See generally 9 B.E. Wrr[N, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property § 49
(9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the government's power to adopt regulation
and impose development fees); 8 B.E. WrrKnN, SUMMARY OF CAliFORNIA AW, ConStitu-
tional Law § 938 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing valid exercises of government police pow-
er).
21. Ehtich, 12 Cal. 4th at 876, 911 P.2d at 444, 50 CaL Rptr. 2d at 257.
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3. The validity of nonpossesory dedications is measured by a
two-prong test.
The court next analyzed the standards set forth in Nollan and Dolan2
and adopted a two-prong test that combined both standards.' The first
prong of this test is the Nollan "essential nexus" standard.' The review-
ing court must determine whether an essential nexus exists between the
public impact and the monetary exaction.' Without such a nexus, the
legitimacy of the exaction would be undermined, and the exaction would
qualify as a taking requiring just compensation.'
The second prong of the Ehrich test adopts the Dolan "rough propor-
tionality" standard.' The reviewing court must find a connection be-
tween the "exaction and the impact of the proposed development."'
The court recognized that lower courts have used inconsistent degrees of
connection when applying the rough proportionality standard.' The
court concluded that the exacted fee must be roughly proportional in
both nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development
change.' The court further stated that the determination of rough pro-
22. Id. at 869-74, 911 P.2d at 439-42, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252-55.
23. Id. at 879-81, 911 P.2d at 446-47, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259-60.
24. Id. at 869-70, 911 P.2d at 439-40, 50 CaL Rptr. 2d at 252-53. In Nollan, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court held that the absence of an essential nexus between the
asserted state interest and the permit condition made the exaction of a public ease-
ment an unconstitutional taking NoUan, 483 U.S. at 838-42.
25. Ehriich, 12 Cal. 4th at 869-70, 911 P.2d at 439-40, 50 CaL Rptr. 2d at 252-53.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 871-74, 911 P.2d at 440-42, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 253-55. In Dolan, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court held that permit conditions imposed on a property owner
were uncompensated takings because the exactions were not sufficiently related to the
projected impact of the development Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321-22. See generally Joseph
D. Lee, Note and Comment, Sudden Impact. The Effect of Dolan v. City of Tigard on
Impact Fees in Washington, 71 WAsIL L REV. 205 (1996) (discussing the evolution of
impact fees in light of Dolan); Catherine Buchanan Lehmann, Dolan v. City of Tigard-
A Heightened Scrutiny of the Takings Clause of the Fifh Amendment, 32 Hous. L
REV. 1153 (1995) (analyzing the heightened standard of review adopted by Dolan).
28. Ehrlich, 12 Cal. 4th at 872, 911 P.2d at 441, 50 CaL Rptr. 2d at 254.
29. Id. at 872-73, 911 P.2d at 441-42, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871-73. The court compared
the following three common applications of the "rough proportionality" standard. (1) a
deferential standard requiring a very generalized connection between the exaction and
the project; (2) a "specifically and uniquely attributable test" requiring the exaction to
be precisely proportional to the burden of the project; and (3) a "reasonable relation-
ship" standard between the exaction and the proposed development. Id.
30. Id. at 879-80, 911 P.2d at 44647, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259-60.
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portionality must entail individualized findings based upon quantitative
evidence provided by the city."'
Lastly, the court applied its two-prong test to the instant case.' The
court held that while the essential nexus between the monetary exaction
and the proposed rezoning existed, the city presented insufficient evi-
dence to demonstrate that the amount of the mitigation fee was roughly
proportionate to the loss of public recreational facilities.' The court
reasoned that because the lost property was private in nature, the city
may not quantify its exaction based upon such a loss." Therefore, the
court remanded the case and required the city to further demonstrate the
additional costs it may incur to attract comparable private recreational
facilities.'
4. A general ordinance is not a taking.
The court held that the "art in public places" fee was not a type of,
exaction subject to a heightened standard of judicial scrutiny.' Because
the imposition of an "art in public places" fee was a "valid exercise ...
of the city's... police power," the court affirmed the conclusion of the
lower court that no taking occurred."
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
Justice Mosk concurred with the majority, but he disagreed with the
generalized notion that monetary exactions should be held to a height-
ened standard of judicial scrutiny.' Justice Mosk analogized the imposi-
tion of monetary exactions to other fees such as excise taxes, special
assessments, and user fees.' Justice Mosk stated that local governments
31. Id. at 873, 911 P.2d at 442, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255. While "precise mathematical
calculation[s" are not required, "mere conclusory statements" by the city will not suf-
fice for "rough proportionality." Id.
32. Id. at 881-85, 911 P.2d at 447-50, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260-63.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 882-85, 911 P.2d at 448-50, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 261-63.
35. Id. For a discussion of measuring damages for taldngs under the California Con-
stitution, see 29 CAL. Jun. 3D Eminent Domain §§ 62-63 (1986 & Supp. 1996).
36. Id. at 885-86, 911 P.2d at 450-51, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263. The "art in public
places" fee was "more akin to traditional land use regulations." Id. For a discussion of
valid and invalid statutes requiring development fees, see A.S. Klein, Annotation, Validi-
ty and Construction of Statute or Ordinance Requiring Land Developer to Dedicate
Portion of Land for Recreational Purposes, or Make Payment in Lieu Thereof, 43
A.LR. 3D 862 (1972 & Supp. 1996).
37. Ehrlich, 12 Cal. 4th at 885-86, 911 P.2d at 450-51, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263.
38. Id. at 892-99, 911 P.2d at 454-59, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 267-72 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
39. Id. at 893-96, 911 P.2d at 455-57, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268-70 (Mosk, J., concur-
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should be granted discretion to impose monetary fees, thus subjecting
them to a lesser standard of judicial scrutiny.4 He wrote that courts
should not interfere with legislatively imposed fees unless they are arbi-
trary or confiscatory." However, because Justice Mosk reasoned that
the case fell into a unique category for ad hoc exactions imposed on
individual property owners, he concurred with the majority and stated
that a heightened standard of scrutiny should apply.'
C. Justice Kennard's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
In Justice Kennard's opinion, she concurred with the majority's holding
that the "art in public places fee" was a general ordinance and not sub-
ject to the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests of Nollan and
Dolan.' Justice Kennard also agreed with the majority that the Nollan
and Dolan tests governed monetary exactions individually imposed on a
single property owner."
Justice Kennard disagreed, however, with the majority's consideration
of the state's Mitigation Fee Act in its formulation of an appropriate
constitutional standard to measure regulatory takings under the Fifth
Amendment.' Justice Kennard concurred with the majority's invalida-
tion of the $280,000 mitigation fee; however, she reasoned that an exac-
tion for the lost use of recreational facilities required the plaintiff to bear
a grossly disproportionate share of an essentially public expense and
thus failed the rough proportionality test.' Because Justice Kennard
ring). These types of restrictions involve dininutions in economic value and have tra-
ditionally been accorded greater deference. Id. at 896, 911 P.2d at 457, 50 Cal. Rpt'. 2d
at 270 (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Mosk characterized the development fees as "spe-
cial assessment[s] placed on developing property, calculated according to preestablished
legislative formulae based on square footage or per unit of development" Id. (Moak, J.,
concurring).
40. Id, at 896-97, 911 P.2d at 457, 50 CaL Rptr. 2d at 270 (Mosk, J., concurring).
41. Id, at 897, 911 P.2d at 458, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 271 (Mosk, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 899-901, 911 P.2d at 459-61, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 272-74 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
43. Id, at 903, 911 P.2d at 461-62, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 274-75 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
44. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
45. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
46. Id. at 909-12, 911 P.2d at 466-68, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 279-81 (Kennard, J., con-
curring and dissenting). See generally 26 Ah. JuR. 2D Eminent Domain §§ 147-149
(Supp. 1996) (discussing factors determining whether the exercise of governmental
police power constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking); 29 CAL Jun. 3D Eminent Domain
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believed the plaintiff was arbitrarily subjected to a disproportionate bur-
den, she concluded that the fee was a taking under the Fifth Amendment
and must be invalidated. 7
D. Justice Werdegar's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Werdegar concurred with the majority, but wrote that an anal-
ysis of the Mitigation Fee Act was unnecessary.'
Ill. IMPACT
The holding in Ehrtich will further the policy of preventing harmful
government restrictions that are an abuse of police power.' The court's
two-prong test will ensure that exactions are imposed only where justi-
fied by a significant public benefit' There has been concern that this
result will elevate the interests of property owners above those of the
community," but the court considered the heightened standard a middle
ground between increased protection of property rights and deferential
government power.' Furthermore, general legislative fees approved by
governments were not at issue.' Ehr/ich analyzed only ad hoc fees arbi-
trarily imposed against single property owners.' Because the trend to-
wards government cutbacks further increases the likelihood of imposing
§ 325 (1986 & Supp. 1996) (discussing activities that are valid exercises of the
government's police power).
47. Ehtrich, 12 Cal. 4th at 912, 911 P.2d at 468, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281 (Kennard,
J., concurring and dissenting).
48. Ild. at 912, 911 P.2d at 468, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281 (Werdegar, J., concurring
and dissenting).
49. EhkIich promotes the purpose of modem taldng jurisprudence of "bar[ring] gov-
ernment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Id, at 880, 911 P.2d at 447, 60
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260. See generally Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, The Supreme Court
Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 HABY. J.L & PUB. POL- 147, 148 (1995) (discussing the
importance of maintaining a property-police power balance).
50. Lehmann, supra note 27, at 1168-69 (discussing the impact of a higher standard
of judicial scrutiny).
51. See generally J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory
Takings Doctrine, 22 EcoLOGY LQ. 89 (1995).
52. Ehrtich, 12 Cal. 4th at 887, 911 P.2d at 451, 50 CaL Rptr. 2d at 264. See gener-
ally James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Land Dedication Conditions and Beyond
the Essential Nexus: Determining "Reasonably Related" Impacts of Real Estate Devel-
opment Under the Takings Clause, 27 TEx. TECH L REv. 73, 92-119 (1996) (discussing
the trend and effects of imposing development fee exactions as conditions for the
issuance of permits).
53. Id. at 899-900, 911 P.2d at 459-60, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 272-73 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
54. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
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development fees, it is crucial to prevent the passing of exorbitant fees
to private real estate developers who will most likely pass these costs on
to California property owners.'
IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to Ehrlich, uncertainty existed as to whether the heightened
standard of scrutiny applied by the court to physical occupations and
invasions of property would also extend to nonpossessory exactions
such as development fees.' Through its holding, the California Supreme
Court permitted this high standard of judicial review in cases involving
conditional development fees imposed on individual property owners at
the discretion of local governments. 7 The court did not, however, ex-
tend such a standard to instances of enforcement of general rules or
ordinances calling for specific fee amounts.'
MONICA M. RANDAzzo
55. See Holloway & Guy, supra note 52, at 77 (explaining that real estate developers
do not earn sufficient revenue to sustain high development costs).
56. Ebtich, 12 Cal. 4th at 874-75, 911 P.2d at 442-43, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255-56.
57. Id. at 876, 911 P.2d at 443-44, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257.
58. Id. at 886-87, 911 P.2d at 450, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263.
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X. ZONING AND PLANNING
A mining or extractive activity operated as a legal non-
conforming use may move into areas not in use at the
time of an ordinance's passage if the operator can dem-
onstrate a manifest objective intent to move into the area
prior to the ordinance's enactment: Hansen Brothers
Enterprises v. Board of Supervisors.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Hansen Brothers Enterprises v. Board of Supervisors,' the Califor-
nia Supreme Court considered whether the "diminishing asset" doctrine
applied to a mining business operated as a legal nonconforming use
when a zoning ordinance excludes mining as a permissible use of the
property.' The trial court denied the plaintiffs petition for writ of man-
1. 12 Cal. 4th 533, 907 P.2d 1324, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 778 (1996). Justice Baxter wrote
the plurality opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justice Arabian concurred. Id. at
540-76, 907 P.2d at 1327-51, 48 Cal Rptr. 2d at 781-805. Justice Werdegar wrote a sepa-
rate concurring opinion. Id. at 576, 907 P.2d at 1351-52, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 805-06
(Werdegar, J., concurring). Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion. Id at 577-81, 907
P.2d at 1352-55, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806-09 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard also
wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice George joined. Id. at 581-92, 907 P.2d at
1355-62, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 809-16 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
2. Id, at 540-76, 907 P.2d at 1327-51, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 781-805. In Hansen, the
plaintiff owned more than 67 acres of land called the Bears Elbow Mine in Nevada
County. Id. at 543, 907 P.2d at 1330, 48 Cal Rptr. 2d at 784. The plaintiff used the
property for mining and production of aggregate, a product composed of gravel, sand,
and rock. Id, The operations consisted of two distinct components, riverbed mining of
sand and gravel and mining of a hillside quarry for rock. Id. In 1954, Nevada County
enacted a land use and development ordinance excluding mining as a permissible use
of the property, but excepted existing uses from its coverage, thus allowing them to
continue as legal nonconforming uses. Id. at 540, 907 P.2d at 1328, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
782. In order to foster eventual achievement of the zoning's objective, the ordinance
prohibited continuation of nonconforming uses discontinued for 180 days. Id. In re-
sponse to the 1975 Surface Mining and Reclamation Act (SMARA), CAL. PuB. REs.
CODE §§ 2710-2795 (West 1996), the Nevada County Board of Supervisors enacted a
mining ordinance requiring mining permits and reclamation plans. Id. at 547, 907 P.2d
at 1332, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786. Because the plaintiff operated the Bear's Elbow Mine
prior to SMARA's enactment, the reclamation plan requirement, not the permit require-
ment, applied to its vested mining rights. Id, at 547, 907 P.2d at 1332-33, 48 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 786-87; see CAL PUB. Rzs. CODE § 2776. Hansen Brothers submitted a reclama-
tion proposal that contemplated removal of all remaining reserves over the next 100
years, ranging between 5000 and 250,000 cubic yards per year. Hansen, 12 Cal. 4th at
548, 907 P.2d at 1333, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787. When the Planning Commission re-
viewed the plan, it concluded that the plaintiff had lost any vested right in the hillside
quarry through discontinuance of mining in that area. Id. The Commission also found
that even if a vested right existed, the proposed use would constitute an impermissible
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date, concluding that although the plaintiff had never discontinued its
aggregate business, the hillside quarry was a separate operation which
the plaintiff had ceased, thus abandoning any vested right 3 The trial
court also found that the proposed use was an impermissible expansion
of a nonconforming use and allowed the imposition of a conditional use
requirement 4 The court of appeal affirmed the judgment on different
grounds, holding that the proposed use would be an impermissible ex-
pansion or intensification. 5 This holding made it unnecessary to consider
whether California recognized the diminishing asset doctrine or whether
the riverbed and hillside were separate operations.' Reversing the court
of appeal, the supreme court held that California does recognize the
diminishing asset doctrine, the exception applied to the plaintiffs case,
and the nonconforming use in which the plaintiff had a vested right was
the aggregate business as a whole, not the separate mining operations.7
expansion or intensification of a nonconforming use. Id, The Commission concluded
that SMARA required a permit to resume mining the hillside quarry. Id. Hansen Broth-
ers appealed to the Board of Supervisors contending that the nonconforming use was
the integrated business of aggregate production, which had continued uninterrupted
since 1946, and not the separate riverbed and quarry mining operations. I& at 548-49,
907 P.2d at 1333-34, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787-88. Hansen Brothers conceded that it con-
ducted mining of the quarry intermittently, but explained that it stock piled mined rock
and further mining was only necessary when the supply of rock was nearly depleted.
Id, The Board rejected Hansen Brothers' argument, concluding that the riverbed and
hillside mining were separate operations. Idl at 549, 907 P.2d at 1333-34, 48 CaL Rptr.
2d at 787-88. Because the operations were separate and the business had discontinued
quarry mining for 180 days or more, interruption of the quarry mining operations for-
feited any vested right in the hillside quarry through discontinuance. Id. Additionally,
the Board agreed with the Commission that the reclamation plan proposed an enlarged
or intensified operation beyond the vested right Id, at 549, 907 P.2d at 1334, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 788. The Board rejected the reclamation plan and denied the plaintiffs
hillside mining rights absent a conditional use permit Id. The plaintiff then filed a
petition for a writ of "administrative mandate," seeking review of the conditional use
permit requirement Id. See generally 8 B.E. WrruN, SUMMARY OF CALFORNIA LAW, Con-
stitutional Law § 471 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the general validity of
zoning); 4 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNiA LAW, Real Property § 84 (9th ed. 1987
& Supp. 1996) (discussing regulation of mining under SMARA).
3. Hansen, 12 Cal. 4th at 550, 907 P.2d at 1334, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 551, 907 P.2d at 1335, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 542, 907 P.2d at 1328, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783.
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II. TREATMENT
A. Lead Opinion
Justice Baxter, writing for the plurality, began his analysis by discuss-
ing zoning and nonconforming uses.' The court then considered whether
mining and other extractive uses are subject to the general prohibition
against intensifying, expanding, or moving nonconforming uses." After
considering the nature of mining, the court concluded that this type of
activity warranted an exception to the general prohibitions. ° The court
reasoned that mining, unlike other nonconforming uses, necessarily an-
ticipates movement and extension into areas beyond those in use at the
time an ordinance is enacted." Recognizing that the diminishing asset
doctrine took this into account, the court held 2 that "[w]hen there is
objective evidence of the owner's intent to expand a mining operation,
and that intent existed at the time of the zoning change, the use may
expand into the contemplated area."13 For support, the court cited
8. Id, at 551-52, 907 P.2d at 1335-36, 48 Cal Rptr. 2d at 789-90. Nonconforming
uses are uses in existence at the time an ordinance is adopted. Id. at 552, 907 P.2d at
1335, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 789. Ordinances exempt these existing uses to prevent consti-
tutional challenges to the ordinance as an uncompensated taking. Id.; see Edmonds v.
County of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 2d 642, 651, 255 P.2d 772, 777 (1953). Generally, a
landowner may not intensify, expand, or move a nonconforming use. Hansen, 12 Cal.
4th at 552, 907 P.2d at 1336, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790; see also County of San Diego v.
McClurken, 37 Cal. 2d 683, 687-88, 234 P.2d 972, 975-76 (1951). If a landowner aban-
dons a nonconforming use the government may prohibit resumption of the nonconform-
ing use. Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach, 6 Cal 3d 279, 286, 98 Cal Rptr. 785, 789 (CL
App. 1971). For a general discussion of nonconforming uses, see 8 B.E. WrrmN, SUMMA-
RY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 854-855 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1996),
and 66 CAL Jul. 3D Zoning §§ 108-111 (1981 & Supp. 1996).
9. Hansen, 12 Cal. 4th at 553, 907 P.2d at 1336, 48 Cal Rptr. 2d at 790.
10. Id. The court reasoned that because mining is essentially a one time use, any
subsequent prohibition of expansion would likely deprive an owner of all economic use
of the land and thus effect a taking requiring compensation. Id.; see Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding that a regulation is a
compensable taldng if the property's total economic value is deprived); Morton v. Supe-
rior Court, 124 Cal. App. 2d 577, 582, 269 P.2d 81, 85 (1954); see also Jonathan
Belcher, Exploring the Latitude of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Local Con-
trol of Surface Mining, 17 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL L 165 (1993) (discussing regulatory
takings in the context of mining); Lorraine Hollingsworth, Note, Lucas v. South Caroli-
na Coastal Commission: A New Approach to the Takings Issue, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J.
479 (1994) (discussing when a government-imposed restriction becomes a taldng).
11. Hansen, 12 Cal. 4th at 553, 907 P.2d at 1337, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790.
12. For a discussion of the diminishing asset doctrine, see Bruce M. Kramer, Local
Land Use Regulation of Extractive Industries: Evoling Judicial and Regulatory Ap-
proaches, 14 UCLA J. ENVTL L & POL'Y 41 (1995-96).
13. Hansen, 12 Cal. 4th at 553, 907 P.2d at 1336, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790.
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McCaslin v. City of Monterey Par*14 whiCt heid that an entire tract of
land may be considered within the exemption even though the landown-
er may only be mining a portion of the land at the time of an ordinance's
enactment 5 In addition, the court recognized the'uniformity with which
other jurisdictions have adopted the diminishing asset doctrine when
faced with the issue."8 The court warned, however, that the exception is
not unlimited.
7
The court next considered three areas of error that the plaintiff attrib-
uted to the court of appea (1) the ruling that the riverbed and hillside
had separate uses; (2) the conclusion that the plaintiff had discontinued
the nonconforming use; and (3) the conclusion that the proposed use
would be an impermissible expansion even if a vested right existed.8
On the plaintiffs first argument, whether the hillside and riverbed had
separate uses, the court agreed with the plaintiff.9 The court stated that
14. 163 Cal. App. 2d 339, 329 P.2d 522 (1958).
15. Hansen, 12 Cal. 4th at 554, 907 P.2d at 1337, 48 Cal Rptr. 2d at 791.
16. Id, at 554-58, 907 P.2d at 1337-40, 48 Cal 'Rptr. 2d at 791-94. Alaska, Illinois,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Utah, and Wisconsin have adopted
the doctrine. Id,; see Stephan & Sons v. Municipality of Anchorage, 685 P.2d 98 (Alas-
ka 1984); County of Du Page v. Elmhurst-Chicago Stone Co., 165 N.E.2d 310 (IlL 1960);
Hawkins v. Talbot, 80 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. 1957); Flanagan v. Town of Hollis, 293 A.2d
328 (N.H. 1972); Moore v. Bridgewater, 173 A.2d 430 (NJ. 1961); Syracuse Aggregate
Corp. v. Weise, 414 N.E.2d 651 (N.Y. 1980); Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake
City, 431 P.2d 559 (Utah 1967); Smart v. Dane County Bd. of Adjustments, 501 N.W.2d
782 (Wis. 1993).
17. Hansen, 12 Cal. 4th at 554-58, 907 P.2d at 1337-40, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791-94.
The court stated the requirements of the diminishing asset doctrine as follows: (1) the
owner must manifest an objective intent to expand; (2) the expansion must be limited
to mining for the same mineral or composite; and (3) the mining may not expand into
neighboring property, or other parcels owned by the same owner, unless these parcels
also enjoy a vested mining right. Id, For a discussion of limitations on nonconforming
uses, see 66 CAL JUL. 3D Zoning §§ 117, 120-121 (1981 & Supp. 1996).
18. Hansen, 12 Cal. 4th at 560, 907 P.2d at 1341, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795. Before ad-
dressing these arguments, the court considered whether the plaintiffs vested rights
extended to the entire 60 acre operation. Id. The court concluded that because the
burden of proof is on the party asserting a right to a nonconforming use, the plaintiffs
rights extended only to the 32 acres established at trial, but that the lower court
should reconsider this issue on remand. Id. at 561-64, 907 P.2d at 1341-44, 48 Cal Rptr.
2d at 795-98. Rather than rule that the right did not exist in the remaining 28 acres,
the court merely held that the record was insufficient to support a contrary finding. Id.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs contention that the County was estopped from
litigating or had waived the right to raise the issue by allowing the use to continue
illegally. Id.
19. Id. at 565-68, 907 P.2d at 1344-46, 48 Cal Rptr. 2d at 798-800.
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the nonconforming use of the property, rather than the separate mining
uses, was the integrated business of aggregate production as a whole."
On the second argument, whether the plaintiff had discontinued its use
of the property, the court concluded that because the nonconforming use
was the business as a whole, which had not been interrupted, it was un-
necessary to consider the issue of discontinuation." On the plaintiffs
third argument, whether the proposed use would be an intensification or
expansion, the court concluded that the record was insufficient to de-
termine the true level of proposed production.' The court did find,
however, that a prohibition against expansion or intensification of a
nonconforming use does not necessarily preclude a reasonable or natural
increase in business volume.' The court stated that, on remand, the
lower court should assess the level of production to determine whether
it would be an expansion or merely an increase in volume.2'
20. Id.
21. Id. at 568-71, 907 P.2d at 1346-48, 48 Cal Rptr. 2d at 800-02. The court noted
the ordinance's failure to define discontinuation, but concluded that defining the term
was unnecessary because discontinuation was no longer an issue. Id. See generally 66
CA. JuR. 3D Zoning §§ 120-21 (1981 & Supp. 1996) (discussing termination of noncon-
forming uses); Douglas Hale Gross, Annotation, Zoning: Right to Resume Nonconform-
ing Use of Premises After Involuntary Break in the Continuity Caused by Govern-
mental Activity, 56 A.LR 3D 138 (discussing abandonment of right to maintain a non-
conforming use through discontinuation); Eric J. Strauss & Mary M. Giese, Elimination
of Nonconformities: The Case of Voluntary Discontinuance, 25 URB. LAW. 159 (1993)
(analyzing voluntary discontinuance and its interpretation by courts and legislatures).
22. Hansen, 12 CaL 4th at 571-75, 907 P.2d at 1348-51, 48 Cal Rptr. 2d at 802-05.
This was because the only evidence of the plaintiffs expansion was SMARA proposal's
"check the box" form that indicated a range of 5000 to 250,000 cubic yards per year.
Id. at 574, 907 P.2d at 1350-61, 48 CaL Rptr. at 804-05. The court suggested that
oppositions to alleged expansions should not be based on SMARA proposals; rather,
the county should wait until actual production appears to exceed the previous level
and seek injunctive relief. Id. at 574-75, 907 P.2d at 1351, 48 CaL Rptr. at 805.
23. Id. at 573, 907 P.2d at 1350, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 804. The court, by analogy, dis-
tinguished between expansions and increases in volume. Id. at 573, 907 P.2d at 1350,
48 CaL Rptr. 2d at 804. If a nonconforming grocery store in an area of increasing
population increases the volume of goods sold or number of customers served, neither
an expansion nor intensification has occurred and it is simply a permissible increase in
volume. Id.
24. Id. at 574-76, 907 P.2d at 1350-51, 48 Cal Rptr. 2d at 804-05.
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B. Justice Werdegar's Concurring Opinion
Justice Werdegar wrote separately to emphasize three elements of the
plurality's opinion.' First, she emphasized California's recognition of the
diminishing asset doctrine.2 Second, Justice Werdegar stressed that the
court should consider the mining operation as a wholeY And finally,
the diminishing asset doctrine allows a nonconforming use in all areas of
the plaintiffs property that "satisfy the doctrine's requirements."2 Jus-
tice Werdegar concluded that the issue for remand is to what extent the
plaintiff satisfied the doctrine's requirements.'
C. Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk dissented on the ground that the court should give def-
erence to the superior court's factual determinations.' Justice Mosk
argued that the superior court properly reviewed the petition for writ of
mandate, and that the reviewing court should not disturb this determina-
tion unless it was not supported by substantial evidence." Justice Mosk
then reviewed the evidence and concluded that there was adequate evi-
dence to affirm the superior court's findings of facts.'
D. Justice Kennard's Dissenting Opinion
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Kennard stated that the lower
courts had properly determined that the riverbed and hillside were sepa-
rate operations.' Justice Kennard reached this conclusion for several
reasons.' First, the plaintiff sold the riverbed sand and gravel and the
25. Id. at 576, 907 P.2d at 1351-52, 48 Cal Rptr. 2d at 805-06 (Werdegar, J., concur-
ring).
26. Id (Werdegar, J., concurring).
27. Id, (Werdegar, J., concurring).
28. I& (Werdegar, J., concurring).
29. Id (Werdegar, J., concurring).
30. Id at 577-81, 907 P.2d at 1352-55, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806-09 (Mosk J., dissent-
ing).
31. Id at 578, 907 P.2d at 1352, 48 CaL Rptr. 2d at 806 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 579-81, 907 P.2d at 1354-55, 48 CaL Rptr. 2d at 808-09 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing).
33. Id. at 581-92, 907 P.2d at 1355-62, 48 CaL Rptr. 2d at 809-16 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting).
34. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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hillside rock separately to some customers.' Second, the SMARA recla-
mation proposal addressed only the hillside quarry, which implied the
plaintiffs acknowledgment of separateness.' Third, the diminishing as-
set doctrine is inconsistent with the replenishment which is concomitant
with riverbed mining.3' Justice Kennard argued that because the uses
were separate, it was appropriate to consider the intensification of each
use separately.' Furthermore, the proposed level of quarry mining in
the SMARA proposal could have reached 250 times the previous level,
which would have been well beyond the plurality's permitted reasonable
growth.' Justice Kennard concluded that because these findings of sep-
arateness, inconsistency, and intensification were supported by substan-
tial evidence, the court should affirm the lower courts' findings.'
M. IMPACT
Prior to Hansen, only one California court had considered the dimin-
ishing asset doctrine.4 Because the plurality and concurring opinions in
Hansen were in clear agreement that California recognizes the doctrine,
this holding carries the force of a majority and resolves any uncertain-
ty.' The impact of the court's holding in Hansen is not likely to be far-
reaching because the doctrine creates a narrowly tailored exception to
the prohibition on expansion of nonconforming uses.' Additionally, al-
lowing mining to move to new areas, when supported by objective evi-
dence of an intent to move prior to an ordinance's passage, is consistent
with the policy of allowing existing uses-which incorporate current and
future mining uses-to continue as nonconforming uses." Therefore,
the diminishing asset exception does not appear to confer preferential
treatment to mining uses; rather, it merely allows the continuation of
business operations, placing them on the same footing as nonmining,
nonconforming uses.
35. Id, (Kennard, J., dissenting).
36. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). The plaintiff explained that riverbed mining was
likely to cease in the near future because of the installation of a dam upstream which
drastically restricted the flow and deposit of sand and gravel at the mining site. Id, at
544, 907 P.2d at 1329, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783.
37. Id at 581-92, 907 P.2d at 1355-62, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 809-16 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting).
38. Id. at 589, 907 P.2d at 1360, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 814 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
39. Id, at 590-92, 907 P.2d at 1362, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 816 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 592, 907 P.2d at 1362, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 816 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 587, 907 P.2d at 1359, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 813 (Kennard, J., dissenting)
(citing McCaslin v. City of Monterey Park, 163 Cal. App. 2d 339, 329 P.2d 522 (1958)).
42. See id. at 559, 576, 907 P.2d at 1340, 1351, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794, 805.
43. See id at 557-58, 907 P.2d at 1339-40, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793-94.
44. See id. at 552, 907 P.2d at 1335-36, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789-90.
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IV. CONCLUSION
While the adoption of the diminishing asset doctrine creates an excep-
tion to the prohibition on expanding nonconforming uses, the doctrine's
requirement of objective evidence of intent is likely to prevent abuse.
Moreover, the holding is consistent with SMARA's concern for protecting
natural resources and prevents the need to expand mining to all possi-
ble property prior to an ordinance's enactment As a consequence, the
court has brought California in line with the majority of other states that
have addressed the issue.
PAUL A. ROSE
45. See CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 2712 (West 1984).
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SUMMARIES
I. Construction of Wills
A court must apply the law in existence at the time a will
is executed to determine the presumed intent of a testa-
tor, unless a contrary intent is expressed in the will.
Newman v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Supreme Court of Califor-
nia, Decided December 5, 1996, 14 Cal. 4th 126, 926 P.2d
969, 59 CaL Rptr. 2d 2.
Facts. Helen Lathrop executed her will in November of 1972. The will
contained a residual clause, leaving a remainder of her estate to her six
brothers and sisters, or to that person's living "issue" upon their death.
Ms. Lathrop's brother, Earl Mitchell, was the natural father of Jon
Newman, who was adopted by his stepfather in 1946. At the time Ms.
Lathrop's will was executed, current law stated that "[a]n adopted child
shall be deemed a descendant of one who has adopted him," thus making
the child ineligible to succeed to the estate of his natural parent. A new
law was enacted in 1985 which would allow Jon Newman to succeed to
the estate of his adopted parent and each of his natural parents. After
Earl Mitchell's death in 1993, Wells Fargo Bank, acting as trustee of
Mitchell's estate, brought a petition to determine which law should apply
for purposes of distributing Earl Mitchell's share of Ms. Lathrop's estate.
The superior court applied the law which was in effect at the time her
will was executed. The court of appeal reversed, arguing that Ms.
Lathrop would be presumptively aware that laws governing inheritance
rights might change.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that a court must apply the law which is in effect at the time
a will is executed to reflect the presumed intent of a testator with regard
to adopted children, unless a contrary intent is expressed within the
body of the will. The court stated that there are presumptions which
govern the construction of wills, and a testator is presumed to be aware
of the law at the time a will is executed. The court argued that it was
more reasonable to require a testator to be aware of the current law
when they execute a will than it would be to assume that a testator in-
tended for the will to be enforced pursuant to some future legislative
fiat. Further, if a testator had a contrary intent, they could express it
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within the body of the will, and the court would permit the testators
intent to prevail over the contrary current law.
Applying the court's holding to the facts of this case, the court held
that the adopted child was not the "issue" of his natural father under the
law at the time Ms. Lathrop's will was executed, and therefore, he could
not receive any benefits as a remainder beneficiary under her will.
II. Courts (Jurisdiction)
Where defendant owners of out-of-state restaurant fran-
chises purposefully avail themselves of the benefits of a
forum state by reaching out to forum residents to create
an ongoing franchise relationship, the franchisees have
sufficient contacts with the forum state such that the fo-
rum state may exercise specific jurisdiction over the non-
resident defendants.
Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., Supreme Court of
California, Decided December 12, 1996, 14 Cal. 4th 434, 926
P.2d 1085, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899.
Facts. Jack-in-the-Box restaurant customers in several states became ill
from exposure to Escherichia coli (E. coli) bacteria traced to hamburgers
sold in select restaurants. Eighty-five Jack-in-the-Box franchisees sued
Foodmaker, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
in San Diego, California of which Jack-in-the-Box is a division, Vons
Companies, Inc. (Vons), Foodmaker's meat supplier who processed and
shipped hamburger patties in its El Monte, California plant to Foodmaker
for use in Jack-in-the-Box restaurants, and other meat processors in San
Diego County Superior Court. The franchisees alleged causes of action
for negligence, breach of implied warranty, and breach of contract, and
sought damages for loss of business caused by the adverse publicity
from the E. coli incidents. Foodmaker filed a cross-complaint against
Vons and the other meat suppliers alleging that the suppliers had deliv-
ered contaminated meat to Foodmaker, exposing Foodmaker to liability
to both injured customers and franchisees. Vons then filed the cross-
complaint at issue against Foodmaker, several meatpackers and several
franchisees including Seabest Foods, Inc. (Seabest) and Washington Res-
taurant Management Inc. (WRMI) (collectively, the defendants), alleging
that the defendants failed to follow the proper cooking procedures and
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government regulations in their hamburger preparation. Vons further
alleged that the defendants failed to require adequate qualifications and
training for their cooks. The defendants specially appeared and moved to
quash service of process on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction.
The trial court considered both parties' contacts with the forum state
of California. Seabest and WRMI both owned Jack-in-the-Box franchises
in Washington State at which the E. coli contamination had injured or
killed its customers. Seabest executed franchise agreements, leases,
equipment purchases and a security agreement with Foodmaker in Cali-
fornia, several of which reference Seabest's home office address as
Granada Hills, California. Further, a majority of Seabest's board of di-
rectors lived in California, its officers attended training sessions in Cali-
fornia, and the franchise agreements for the Washington restaurants
provided that any contract disputes would be litigated in California under
California law. Seabest also sent invoices and payments to Foodmaker's
San Diego headquarters, and hired an accountant in San Diego to prepare
monthly financial statements for Foodmaker. While WRMI conducted
most of its business with Foodmaker through Foodmaker's Washington
office, WRMI negotiated three franchise agreements in California and
executed one in California. Moreover, WRMIs franchise agreements with
Foodmaker also provided that any disputes would be resolved in Califor-
nia under California law. WRMI officers participated in on-site training
and policy discussions with Foodmaker's San Diego office, as well as
engaged in occasional telephone conversations with Foodmaker in San
Diego. Finally, WRMI received and mailed purchase and income state-
ments and payments to Foodmaker's San Diego office. The trial court
granted Seabest and WRMI's motions to quash for lack of personal juris-
diction. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's finding, also order-
ing Vons to pay the defendants' costs on appeal.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that the defendants were subject to specific jurisdiction in the
forum state of California because both defendants purposefully availed
themselves of forum benefits, and a substantial nexus or connection
existed between the defendants' forum activities and the plaintiffs
claims. The two defendant franchisees knowingly established a connec-
tion to a business with its headquarters in the forum state. Further, the
defendants purposefully undertook ongoing contractual obligations to the
California business, agreeing that all disputes would be litigated under
California law. Therefore, the court concluded that the defendants had
purposefully availed themselves of forum benefits.
The court further held that the exercise of specific jurisdiction is war-
ranted so long as the claim bears a substantial connection to the
nonresident's forum activities. It is unnecessary to require that the claim
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arise directly from the defendant's contacts with the forum state. Instead,
the court found that a relaxed, flexible standard comports with the fair-
ness rationale of the specific jurisdiction doctrine provided by the U.S.
Supreme Court. In applying the substantial connection standard, the
court reasoned that because the defendants sought out and maintained
an ongoing contractual relationship with Foodmaker, they became joint
tortfeasors in the instant case. The court also noted that because the
allegedly deficient procedures were set forth in the contract between the
defendants and Foodmaker, this forum contact bore a substantial rela-
tionship to the alleged injuries.
The court finally determined that the assertion of specific jurisdiction
in the instant case was fair. Considering the burden on the defendant,
the interests of the forum state, the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief,
the interests of judicial efficiency, and the shared interest of the several
states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies, the court
held that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the exercise of juris-
diction in this action would be unreasonable.
III. Criminal Law
A. Because the initiative version of the "three
strikes" provision, Proposition 184, was substan-
tively identical to the legislative version of the
statute, Penal Code section 667, the legislature's
definition of a prior felony conviction, which
included out-of-state convictions, was applied to
Proposition 184.
People v. Hazelton, Supreme Court of California,
Decided December 5, 1996, 14 Cal. 4th 101, 926
P.2d 423, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443.
Facts. The defendant was charged with felonies in two separate com-
plaints. The first complaint alleged that the defendant had suffered one
prior felony conviction under Penal Code section 667, and the second
complaint alleged that the defendant had suffered two prior felony con-
viction, one of which was an out-of-state conviction. Before these cases
were adjudicated, Proposition 184, the initiative version of the three
strikes law, was adopted and became operative. In response to the
defendant's motion, the trial court ruled that under Proposition 184, the
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defendant's prior out-of-state conviction could not be used for three-
strike purposes. The court of appeal reversed and remanded.
Holding. Affuming the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court concluded that the three strikes provisions in Penal Code section
667 and Proposition 184 were "virtually identical" and that section 667's
definition of a prior felony conviction was applicable to Proposition 184.
Because that definition included out-of-state convictions, the supreme
court held that such convictions could be used for three-strike purposes.
B. Evidence of third party threats is admissible to
support a self-defense claim if there is evidence
that the defendant reasonably associated the
victim with those threats.
People v. Minifie, Supreme Court of California,
Decided August 29, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 1055, 920
P.2d 1337, 56 CaL. Rptr. 2d 133.
Facts. The defendant was charged with two counts of assault with a
deadly weapon and one charge of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon.
At trial, the defense attempted to establish self-defense by introducing
evidence that individuals, whom the defendant reasonably associated
with the victim, had threatened him prior to the shooting incident. Addi-
tionally, the defense attempted to introduce evidence of the violent repu-
tation of the individuals who made the threats. The court held the evi-
dence inadmissible under California Evidence Code, section 1100. The
court also noted that even if the evidence was found admissible under
California Evidence Code, section 1100, it would have been excluded
under California Evidence Code, section 352, because it would confuse
the jury and consume too much time.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that evidence of threats by those whom the defendant reason-
ably associated with the victim are admissible to establish a self-defense
claim. In proving self-defense, a defendant is entitled to prove that he
had a reasonable and honest fear for his life. Accordingly, the jury must
consider evidence which reveals the defendant's state of mind at the
time of the act. Therefore, the court concluded that the third party
threats which the defendant associated with the victim and other rele-
vant circumstances should be admitted. Further, the court held that evi-
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dence of the violent reputation of the group associated with the victim
should have been admitted because this is not character evidence being
used to explain the victim's conduct, but instead is evidence establishing
the defendant's state of mind.
While acknowledging a trial judge's discretion to exclude prejudicial
evidence under California Evidence Code, section 352, the court held that
the trial judge abused his discretion by excluding all the evidence relat-
ing to the third party threats. The court reasoned that the evidence was
not outweighed by its prejudicial value because proving the defendant's
state of mind is a key element of the defendant's self defense action.
While the court held the error was harmless as to the possession of a
firearm charge, the court held the error prejudicial to the two assault
charges because the excluded evidence was crucial to the self-defense
claim.
C. A defendant cannot claim his right to effective
council was violated when he was represented
by an attorney who was on inactive statas when
the suspension resulted from noncompliance
with mandatory continuing legal education
(MCLE) requirements.
People v. Ngo, Supreme Court of California, Decided
October 24, 1996, 14 Cal. 4th 30, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d
456.
Facts. On May 9, 1994, the defendant was charged with thirteen counts
including second degree robbery, attempted robbery, false imprisonment,
burglary, buying or receiving stolen property, and automobile theft; there
were also allegations of a weapon use enhancement on some of the
counts. Defendant plead no contest and the court agreed to sentence
defendant to ten years in prison. At the sentencing hearing, the defen-
dant expressed a desire to withdraw his plea and asked for new council.
The trial court denied this request, and the ten year sentence was im-
posed. The defendant obtained a certificate of probable cause and ap-
pealed. The defendant argued that he received ineffective assistance of
council because his attorney was put on inactive status by the state bar
for failure to comply with MCLE requirements. The court of appeal
found that this constituted ineffective assistance of council and that
there was a per se denial of the right to council. The court of appeal
reversed the defendant's conviction. The Supreme Court of California
granted the petition for review.
Holding. The supreme court reversed the opinion of the court of appeal
holding that the council was not rendered ineffective when the attorney
has been suspended for failure to comply with MCLE requirements.
MCLE requires members of the bar to complete certain amounts of legal
education in a specified time period. Failure to supply the bar with proof
of this compliance will make an attorney inactive without a hearing.
Distinguishing this type of attorney suspension with other types that
may result from attorney wrongdoing, the court reasoned that failure to
comply with these requirements does not directly relate to the profes-
sional competence of the attorney. The court noted that noncompliance
could result from simply failing to send in the appropriate paperwork,
and therefore, the defendant was not prejudiced.
IV. Deed of Trust
California Civil Code section 2943 permits a seller to
seek recovery of sums omitted from a payoff statement as
an unsecured obligation under the principles of unjust
enrichment.
Ghirardo v. Antonioli, Supreme Court of California, Decided
October 31, 1996, 14 Cal. 4th 39, 924 P.2d 996, 57 Cal. Rptr.
2d 687.
Facts. The plaintiffs purchased real property from the defendants sub-
ject to two promissory notes. Following payment of the smaller note, the
plaintiffs requested that the defendants make a demand for the balance
of the obligation on the larger note. After the balance was paid, the de-
fendants discovered that their request was understated and sought the
additional sum from the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed this
action contending that the notes were usurious. The superior court found
for the plaintiffs. Furthermore, the court denied the defendants' cross-
claim reasoning that the defendants were not entitled to a deficiency
judgment because they had conveyed the deed of trust rather than pro-
ceed by way of judicial foreclosure. The court of appeal affirmed the
superior court's decision. The California Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that the notes did not fall within the meaning of usury law. On re-
mand, the court of appeal stated that the defendants could not recover
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on the notes because under California Civil Code section 2943, amounts
excluded are not collectible.
Holding. Reversing the court of appeal, the supreme court held that the
defendants could recover under common law principles. Under the law
of restitution, the supreme court found that a party may be required to
make restitution if it unjustly retained a benefit at the expense of the
other party. Thus, a party may recover for a mistake of fact where the
unjustly enriched party would be receiving a windfall by the miscalcula-
tion of the debt.
While finding that the defendants could recover by restitution, the
court held that the defendants could not recover under two alternate
theories. First, the court held that a party cannot obtain a deficiency
judgment unless the party first proceeds by judicial foreclosure. Second,
the defendants could not recover under Civil Code section 2943, which
incorporated the unjust enrichment theory, because it had not been en-
acted at the time of payoff and reconveyance. Thus, the same action
today could be brought under this statute.
V. Healing Arts
Investigative subpoenas issued by the Medical Board of
California while conducting an inquiry into physician
misconduct are not "discovery" within the meaning of
California Evidence Code section 1157, which provides
that hospital peer review committee records are not sub-
ject to discovery.
Arnett v. Dal Cielo, Supreme Court of California, Decided
October 3, 1996, 14 Cal. 4th 4, 923 P.2d 1, 56 CaL Rptr. 2d
706.
Facts. Following three incidents in as many months, two nurses at
Alameda Hospital reported to their supervisor that they suspected an
anesthesiologist, "Dr. A," had been treating patients while under the in-
fluence of narcotics. Following the reports, the Hospital's Medical Exec-
utive Committee, a peer review body statutorily required to monitor the
adequacy and quality of medical care, convened to address the matter.
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Dr. A appeared before the committee and admitted to injecting himself
with narcotics he had taken from the hospital's supplies. Dr. A requested
a leave of absence for two months to attend an in-patient drug rehabilita-
tion program. California Business and Profession Code section 805 re-
quires that a peer review committee report to the Medical Board of Cali-
fornia (the Board), the agency responsible for the licensing and discipline
of physicians, whenever a physician takes a leave of absence following
notice of an investigation into conduct likely to be detrimental to patient
care. The hospital did not file such a report. Upon Dr. A's return, his
privileges were severely limited. The hospital was also required to report
this to the Board, but failed to do so.
Despite the hospital's failure to report the leave of absence and re-
stricted privileges, a confidential informant notified the Board that Dr. A
was addicted to narcotics and treated patients while under the influence.
The hospital provided the investigator with some information but refused
access to any peer review records. The investigator then served a sub-
poena duces tecum, issued pursuant to the Board's investigatory sub-
poena power, upon the hospital's chief executive officer seeking the peer
review body's records concerning Dr. A. The hospital's chief executive
officer, William Dal Cielo, refused to comply with the subpoena. The
Board's executive director, Dixon Arnett, filed a petition for an order to
enforce the subpoena. The hospital opposed the petition on the grounds
that the records sought were immune from discovery under California
Evidence Code section 1157, which protects peer review bodies' records
from discovery. The trial court granted the petition and the court of
appeal affirmed.
Holding. Reaching the same conclusion as the court of appeal, the su-
preme court affirmed on different grounds. The Board argued that dis-
covery meant "the formal exchange of evidentiary information between
parties to a pending adversary proceeding," while the hospital argued
that it included subpoenas issued by administrative agencies for inves-
tigative purposes. The court of appeal reasoned that because the word
"discovery" is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation ex-
trinsic evidence should be considered. The supreme court rejected that
approach, applying a different rule of construction. The court stated that
although "plain meaning" is the general rule of construction, "when a
word used in a statute has a well-established legal meaning, it will be
given that meaning in construing the statute." The court stated that al-
though discovery has the informal meaning of "finding something out by
search or observation," the word also has the specific legal meaning
advanced by the Board. The court reasoned that because the legislature
knew of the specific legal meaning, as evidenced by its use in other areas
of law, the specific legal meaning should prevail. The court also stated
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that the legislature was aware of the distinction between discovery and
the subpoena power. Therefore, the court concluded that because the
investigatory subpoena was not discovery within the meaning of Evi-
dence Code section 1157, the peer review body's records were not pro-
tected from the subpoena
VI. Health & Safety
The Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of
1986 is applicable to water stored in or run through
household drinking water faucets as a "source of drinking
water."
People ex rel. Lungren, Supreme Court of California, Decided
December 9, 1996, 14 Cal. 4th 294, 926 P.2d 1042, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 855.
Facts. On November 4, 1986, the people of California adopted Proposi-
tion 65, the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act (hereinafter
the Act). The Act provides that chemicals known to cause cancer or
birth defects shall not be permitted to pass into any "source of drinking
water." The Attorney General of California brought suit against sixteen
manufacturers and distributors of drinking water faucets seeking injunc-
tive relief and civil penalties for violations of the Act. The faucets manu-
factured and distributed by the defendants allegedly contained significant
amounts of lead, which was known by the state to increase the risk of
cancer and birth defects when released into water. The trial court sus-
tained the defendants' demurrer, finding that water faucets were not
sources of drinking water and were therefore not within the scope of the
Act. The California Court of Appeal denied the Attorney General's re-
quest for a writ of mandate for the same reasons. The sole issue present-
ed to the California Supreme Court was the meaning and scope of the
phrase "sources of drinking water," and whether it included the faucets
manufactured and distributed by the defendants.
Holding. The California Supreme Court held that the provisions of the
Act were applicable to household drinking water faucets. The court first
looked to the plain meaning of the statute to discern the intended
meaning of "sources of drinking water." The definition of "source" in the
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statute provides for two classifications. First, the regional water quality
control jurisdiction includes lakes, rivers, creeks, and other bodies of
water. Therefore, waters of all types that are considered "suitable for
domestic or municipal use" are sources of drinking water under the Act.
The second class of source includes "present sources of drinking water."
The Attorney General successfully argued that this second classification
included water that was part of the delivery system of the water supply,
thereby covering the faucets themselves. The California Supreme Court
next looked at the legislative purpose of the Act to determine the intend-
ed interpretation of sources of drinking water. The court found the pri-
mary purpose to be protection of the general public from chemicals that
cause cancer, birth defects, and other reproductive harm. The ballot
materials connected to the Act further evidence that in order to achieve
this purpose, the Act was specifically designed to cover drinking water
that comes through the faucet. Finally, the court noticed that the inter-
pretation of the Health and Welfare Agency (HWA), the designated "lead
agency," should be given adequate deference. However, HWA did not
propose any definition for sources of drinking water, stating that the
phrase was adequately defined within the statute. Therefore, the court
concluded that the Attorney General was correct in applying the Safe
Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act to drinking water faucets as
sources of drinking water.
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